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Industrialization and Interventions. The Role of
Governmentsin Developing Countries: Brazil.
Introduction
The results of nearly a century of industrialization in
Brazil are an open invitation to controversy. A writer keen
on painting a rosy picture could, for instance, draw
attention to its exceptional growth record, which until the
1980s compared favourably with most developing
countries—LDC (table 1). He could also point out that
Brazil has today a large and diversified manufacturing
sector, whose value-added ranked seven in the world in
1988; and that over 1965-80, the growth of manufactured
exports reached East Asian standards.!
Yet, it would not be difficult to paint a gloomy picture
either. For instance, Brazil has one of the worst inflation
records among the LDCs, one of the highest debt-service
ratios, and one of the worst income distributions. In 1980,
35.4 % of the economically active population was estimated
to be under-employed.2 The indicators of productivity and
technological activity are not encouragingeither, with Brazil
lagging behind countries like Korea and Mexico. To
complete the picture, in the 1980s, output and




real poeple rates in this study, unless stated otherwise, are average
regression¢ rales, computed using the least-squares method, with the
XO is th equation taking the form log Xt = log Xo+tlog (1+r) t +et , where
aerelevant variable,r is the rate of growth,andt is time.
DIGITALIZADO PELA BIBLIOTECA EUGÊNIO GUDIN EM PARCERIA COM A DECANIA DO CCJE/UFRJ
Industialization and Interventions. Brazil.
Texto para discussao




































       
SE tglossenl 3 » a
ssociated in the trade and developmentliterature, with
3 ga|a5 Ga od a g $ Z an i
nwardeT Poyreece fapses of outward
3 orientation. Rather un
y, neoclassicals have
2 |. # geg8 been inclined to credit th
e good results to the allegedly
S718lo eae al”, a2 Ee \ export-oriented, hands-off periods of the governm
ent's
3 RISAa] 28 s@ policy, peaya Bat
apes ie bea when import
e | & 8 2As substit
ution and selective intervention prevailed. The
— 3 eG ge | arguments are
well known. Qubward-orientatien, equated
gS Ae... ¢ z Bap with a neutral i
ncentive regime, would have led, inter
_ & R een a3 5 3 25 a alia, to better reso
urce allocation, economies of scale and
Bsles 8 E 29 8 technological dynamism
. Conversely, IS and its selective
| os Ee policies would have, inter alia, dis
torted resource
a S82 cas on: EES allocation, hampered exports, and pro
moted oligopolistic




t ; i i
& ageSse se = 5s uthors closer to the structuralist traditio
n, in turn,
BIS 3 aay S emphasise therole of IS policies in bu
ilding a diversified
ae a eae industrial structure, in overcoming supply inelasticities,
glglohes alae gk? nd in boosting growth. It is acknowledged that the IS
Bla SS Kl’ 2gos strategy has hurt exports, but the bad results, particularly
8 3 gees of the 1980s, would have come from the side of
Jld[Flasex¢ ga Ee y macroeconomic failure, not a debilitating sect
oral
gl 8 anand ¢ Ess 3 misallocation, as Fishlow (1990: 66) put it. Sceptical of
Stinene83ga ad eaepeasant s
trategies, they argue that the state has
g| ZeSeSe : 22228 policies. back up IS with sound fiscal and monetary
alajravs |e S803 |
a $2653o g eSee E nage BG | theypotenttere are merits in these two interpretations,
$ S523 rs 3 Bee as ; ve important drawbacks. The neoclassical
Sar R es eee
a6 83a 23083 =< 1
bes als ins 24 elestenicnBenals of the neoclassical critique of the IS
and Balassa (1989). ages of outward-orientation see Krueger (1984)
Textos para Discussdo
view correctly draws attention to the benefits of a more
open economy, but, given its assumptions that product
and factor markets are generally efficient in LDCs, they
tend to underestimate the market failures facing the
Brazilian government, and therefore, fail to consider the
dynamic interaction between the IS and export
promotion periods2. On the other hand, the structuralist
view rightly points out that, given the nature of the
market failures in the product and factor markets,
governmentintervention was vital. However, it does not
address the point that under an inward-oriented
incentive regime, the diagnosing and correction of
marketfailures was far from satisfactory, leading to often
misguided and wholesale government interventions,
which, in turn, set the stage for much of the
‘macroeconomic failures’.
All these things considered, this paper seeks to show
that the understanding of the role of the government in
Brazil's industrialization, and its mixed results, can be
substantially improved if the analysis is focused on the
nature of the market failures it has addressed, and the
validity of the remedies it has used. Drawing on Lall
(1991a), the underlying assumption is that the degree of
industrialization success in LDCs, varies in direct
proportion to the efficiency with which the government
has tackled imperfections in product and factor markets.
The analysis is divided into five sections, broadly
reflecting the evolution of the government policy towards
industrialization. That is, the minimalist government of
the pre-1956 period, the 1956-63 import-substitution
strategy; the pseudo-neoclassical revolution of 1964-73;
 
2 For a general critique of the neoclassical approac
industrialization in LDCs see Lall (1991a, 1991b). p h to
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the half-hearted attempt to reform the IS during 1974-
79; and the complete lack of direction of the 1980s.
I- The ‘Unintentional’ Industrialization: the pre-1956
period.
When the first significant surge of manufacturing
investment took place in the 1890s, Brazil could be
described as an open, export-oriented and agricultural-
based economy, with its trade-GDP ratio standing roughly
at 28 % (table A.3). At that time, agriculture accounted for
56% of GDP (table A.2), with more than a half of the
agricultural output (mainly coffee) being exported.
Industry accounted for only 12 % of GDP and consisted
mostly of small establishments in the textile and food
sectors.> Manufactured exports were virtually inexistent,
with coffee accounting for as much as 60 % of total
exports.
Half a century later, though, the picture was somewhatdifferent. Notwithstanding the low (by subsequentstandards) levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), thenearly uninterrupted growth experienced during thisperiod had increased the industry's share of GDP to 30%and the manufacturing import-ratio had dropped to anamazing 10% (see chart 1). Yet, Brazil's industrialStructure wasstill ‘shallow’ and lacking diversification.The share of the so-called heavy industries was only 35%Ee Aa), and despite considerable development, bothmieten= and durable consumer good sectors werestillmeee pounting for not more than 11% of the total
acturing output (table A.5). As for exports, they
ee
3 Al
sectors mee industrial inquire gave the textile, food, beverage and apparelombined share of 62%, See IBGE (1990).
%
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continued to be entirely dominated by agricultural
products, with coffee still coming close to 60% of total
exports (table A.6). Overall, the economy had significantly
reduced its ‘dependence’ on foreign trade, halving the
trade-GDP ratio to around 7%. To use a Cliché, Brazil
Seemed to have completed in mid-1950s the ‘easy’ stageof import substitution.
The government's role in this first phaseof the Brazil's
industrialisation is somewhat polemical, but most authors
seem to agree that, whatever it was, it has changed
markedly after the Great Depression. It makes sense,
then, to look at these two periods—pre and post Great
Depression—separately.
50) Chart 1: Brazil's Manufacturing Import-Ratio. 1907-55 (1939 prices)
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Source: Villela e Suzigan (197739) for 1907 and 1919 and Malan etal, (1980:207) note: 1907 and 1919 in currentprices
Before the Great Depression.
The dominant view in the literature is that theg0vernment’s role in the first steps of Brazil’s
 
Industralization and Interventions,Brazil.
industrialization was minimal, or putit differently, that
industrialization originated from changes in the relative
prices provoked by external shocks, and/or from linkages
between the coffee and manufacturing sectors.4 No doubt,
this perception seems to square with the liberal rhetoric
of the first republican governments and their agrarian
political base.5 The fly in the ointment, though, is the
existence of evidences suggesting, first, that tariffs were
anything but low, and second, that the state has granted
incentives and subsidies, notably, to the heavy industry.
Table 2, for instance, shows a significant, if not
monotonic, increase in the actual tariff rates since the
independence, to levels that cannot be outright dismissed
as not affecting resourceallocation. In addition, evidences
on light industry sectors such as textiles, footwear and
beverages, indicate that they were heavily protected, with
actual tariffs reaching three-digits in certain periods.§ As
to the other incentives, they seem to have included, e.g.,
tariff exemptions for capital good imports, a ‘law ofsimilar’(1890) which prohibited tariff exemptions forgoods produced domestically, and loans and profit-guarantees for heavy industries such as steel, cement andcaustic soda. The latter appear to have grown in
Textos para DiscussGo
 
Table_2: Brazil's Actual Tariff Rates*. 1893-55 _(%)1823- 1833-1893 1903-1913. 1923. 1933. 1943-_~:1951-
32 82 1902 12 22 32 42 50 55
 
10.0 27.2 24.0 28.0 36.0 «37,0 23.0 7.0 5.6
Tariff revenue divided by total imports. Arithmetic average. Source: Silva, G. A.
(1983) ‘A Reforma Aduaneira no Brasil’ in Estudos Aduaneiros n°11, ESAF,Brasilia, asuoted by Machado (1990).  
importance after the WWI, prompted by a security-Conscious government.7
However, these evidences are played down on the
grounds that they do not prove that the government was
systematically pursuing industrialization, nor that the
measures taken were effective. Much ammunition is spent
on tariffs whose main purpose is thought to have been
Scal, and whose impact is believed to have been limited
given that they were specific, and tended to be offset by
international prices and exchange rate variations.8 In
Suzigan (1984:88), for instance, this argument is
underpinned by evidence showing that the real landed
price of imports (i.e. including actual tariffs and exchange
Tate variations) has actually fallen until 1930, except for
the WWI period. As to the other incentives, the claim is
that they were not used in a systematic fashion, and had
more of a dejure than a de facto existence.9
 
7 See Topik (1980) andVillela e Suzigan (1977) fordetails.
During 1893-1932, customsrevenuesaccounted in average for 52%
of the citeeae revenue (Machado 1990:79). s
The tariff exemptions for capital goods and the ‘law of similar’ areCases in point. The formeris said to have lacked anyclearcriteria (bein
an easy prey to rent-seekers), and to be limited in scope for fiscalreasons(tariffs were the main source of government revenue). The latt
is believed to have been strictly enforced onlyin the 1950s. er
10
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Strong as these arguments maybe,it seemsdifficult to
deny that changes in the relative prices received a
valuable, if modest, assistance of government's incentives,
particularly as far as tariffs and the light industry go. That
protection seems to have declined during the period does
not tell us much about the its absolute level. Moreover, if
one takes into account that productivity in the light
industry was apparently well below the international
frontier, protection appears to have been all the more
necessary.!° The long arm of coincidence would have to
be stretched too far to explain why the first spurts of
manufacturing investment occurred only after quasi-free-
trade ‘agreements’ with Portugal and England had
expired.!! This does not mean to say, however, that state
was interventionist or developmental. In fact, the limited
service that it rendered industry by raising tariffs and
' giving incentives, appears to have been more than offset
by its inaction regarding marketfailures in the financial
markets, infrastructure, education and science and
technology (S &T).
During all the period, the financial sector remained
basically geared to cater for the coffee-export sector’s
financial needs, and even though the state owned thelargest commercial bank—Banco do Brasil—there wasvirtually no source of long-term credit for
Se
10 Accordin,‘ ig to Clark, W. "II". Department of rk, W. (1910) "Cotton Goods in Latin America, Part
Com 2_ Fishlow (1972:18), Lien Special Agents Ser. n°36. 1910, quoted in
Productivity in the Brazilian textile-cottoncnaustry aa 1910 between 50 to 30% below that of the US, and even; at below thatof the American industry 50 years earlier.
The last trade agreement expired in 1844. According to thisagreement, the tariff rates on Engli:Machado (1990) for detaite nglish products could not exceed 15%. See
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manufacturing.!2 The government played an important
‘functional’ role in expanding the infrastructure, yet, as
these investments were mainly targeted to serve the
coffee-export sector (concentrated in the south-east),
they neither provided industry with access to a unified
national market, nor with an adequate energy supply. As
to education, despite being free and compulsory, the
share of total population enrolled in school in 1930 (6.3
%) was well below the already dismal Latin America's
average (8%) (Albert, 1983:38). Finally, government
action in the area of S&T was limited to the creation a
few specialised institutions in the engineering and
biomedical fields (the first university was established as
late as 1920), with virtually no links with industry.}3
After the Great Depression
In the post-1930 period, the government's hand
became more visible, although most of the policies that
favoured industrialization can be said to have had other
targets in mind,i.e., balance of payment (BP) adjustment,
and growth. Most accounts give trade and exchange rate
policies the pride of place. In fact, the government
handling of these policies took the classical contours of
an import-substitution (IS) Strategy. Its response to the
Great Depression is seen to have been ground-breaking.
Instead of pursuing the classical BP-adjustment policies of
exchange rate devaluation and fiscal-cum-monetary
12 See Tavares (1973) and Villela e Suzi an (11914-1945, Banco do Brazil accounted foreae Pi details. During




contraction, the government opted for a different
package that included the former but not the latter.!4
Given the size of the gap in the external accounts, this
policy mix had to be complemented by foreign exchange
and import controls. The success of this policy in
sustaining incomelevels, adjusting the BP and boosting
manufacturing investment seems to have left a permanent
mark in Brazilian policy makers. From then on, except for
a few short periods, import and foreign exchange
controls would be a key element of the government's
policies whatever the ideological colours of the
incumbents.
During 1930-55, import and exchange rate controls
took different forms and were combined with different
exchange-rate policies, gradually becoming more
favourable to industry. Customs tariffs were left playing
second fiddle (they remained specific until 1957, see
table 2). From 1930 until the outbreak of the WW1,
except for the brief 1934-37 liberal period, imports were
controlled by a licensing system, used concurrently with a
rising real exchange rate. Until 1934, foreign debt
payments and government's imports were given priorityin the allocation of foreign exchange. This, however,changed after 1937, when producer goods gainedPrecedence. An improvement in the BP during the warled to a short-lived liberalisation, but import controlswere re-introduced in 1947. This time under a fixed andmcreasingly over-valued exchange rate, and with a tacitvomee not allowing competitive imports in. In 1953, awithe productple-exchange-rate system was adopted,
uct-specific rates for exports, and a five-
—
14 See Furtado (1963) and Villela and Suzigan (1977) for details.
Textos para Discussdo
category auction system for imports. Imports of producer8oods, however, continued to be favoured.15
These Policies are seen to have helped industryin twomain ways. First, by virtually eliminating importcompetition to the light industry, and by increasing
protection for the fledgling heavy industry. This wouldhave allowed these industries not only to survive andlearn, but also to grow ahead of income through IS.Second, by subsidizing the imports of capital goods andTaw material, notably after 1947, with a highly overvaluedexchangerate. 16 The changes in Brazil’s import structure(table A.4), the behaviour of the manufacturing-importratio (chart 1 and table A.7), and an annual growth rate of8.4 % for manufacturing output (1930-55), all tend tosupport these arguments.
However, the cost involved are no less visible. One
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consumer loss. More damaging losses appears to have
been inflicted on two other interrelated issues, i.e., the
long term efficiency of the Brazilian industry and the
external balance.
Economic theory has already shown that the
replacementoftariffs for non-tariff barriers (NTBs) leads
to non-competitive behaviour, aggravating the infant
industry problems of X-inefficiency and endless-learning
periods.!”? The experience of countries like Korea,
however, also suggests that these problems can be largely
avoided, and monopolistic behaviour even turned into a
positive factor, if protection is made conditional on
export performance, forcing firms into the international
market. In Brazil, during 1930-55, external competition
wastotally removed but nothing was put in place to pushfirms down the learning curve. Firms had, then,
incentives to expand to fill the gaps left by imports, butlittle incentive to increase efficiency given thetechnologically poor domestic competition.
With the wrong set of incentives, it does not come as asurprise that manufacturing exports never really took off.Table A.7 shows that the manufacturing-export ratio hasdecreased sharply over 1907-49 to a mere 2.3%, and in1955 this figure must have been even lower, given thatduring 1950-55
i See Bhagwati (1965) and
8During 1950-55, manufacA.6), while manufact(IBGE 199g),tUTIRg out
Helpman and Krugman (1989, chap.3).
tured exports nominally decreased (tableput has increased 65 percent in real terms
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to be less affected by the exchange-rate policy. Yet, this
has not prevented regular foreign exchange crises from
happening, or the external debt to grow, notably in the
first half of the 1950s. 19
These inefficiencies provoked by the trade policy were
aggravated by the government's belated and, largely,
unsatisfactory response to the industry's growing
Tequirements for infrastructure, financing and human
capital. It was not until the beginning of the 1950s, that
effective steps were taken to tackle some of these market
failures. An exception to this rule, was the state’s direct
intervention in the production of intermediary goods in
the early 1940s. Although this move hadlittle to do with
an industrialization strategy—it was prompted mainly by
military reasons related to WWII—and wascarried out only
when the state had run out of private options, it would
later prove to be economically sound. This intervention
not only smoothed the transition towards a more
integrated industrial structure, but also contributed to
develop a major source of comparative advantage.20
But going back to the industry’s needs, the state’sactions in the area of infrastructure were hampered by agovernment thorn between the virtues of public and
private investment, and ending up with the worst of both
 
19 The external debtthat had been stable around $600 million in thesecond halfof the 1940s, shot up to $1445billion in 1955 (IBGE 1990).




worlds. Key sectors such as electric power and
telecommunications were dominated by private firms
(mainly foreign companies), but were regulated by state
and municipal governments that constantly imposed
unrealistic rates. The result was low and uncoordinated
investments. On the other hand, services that had passed
to public hands(e.g. railways), tended to suffer from the
lack of long-term planning and the state’s inadequate
financial and fiscal base. It was only in the early fifties that
a clear option for public sector investments emerged,
with key state enterprises (SEs) being created,
particularly in the energy sector (oil and electric power).
This move was backed up by the establishment of a
development bank (National Development Bank—BNDE—
1952), to be funded by fiscal and external resources, with
the specific aim to finance improvements in the
infrastructure.2! Major investments, however, would only
begin in 1956.
On the financial side there was little progress, if at all.
Government intervention, to a certain extent, was moreof a hindrance than a help. For instance, the developmentof the financial sector was considerably delayed by theill-
conceived ‘usury law’ (1933) which limited the maximumrate of interest to an annual rate of 12%. This, coupledwith inflation averaging 13% annually over 1940-55, ledthe financial sector to shrink exactly when the economy'sincreasing degree of industrialization and
eee
tech, cst measures were inspired by the reports of two joint Brazil-USdeyllagnteHtCen (1948, 1949), set up to look into Brazil's
infrastruc Problems. Both reports maintained that the poor(1980). 7 ae was a major bottleneck to be overcome. See Malanetal.
supply endler (1968) gives an accurate account of the acute powerPply problems facing the industry in the post-warperiod.
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commercialisation was demanding the opposite.?? As aresult, industry ended up without both long-termfinancing and short-term funds for working capital.Without proper credit, and with a negligible stockmarket, firms had to increasingly rely on internal finance,
whose limits were pushed by constant, increasingly
elusive, attempts to raise mark-ups. In this endeavour,
firms were ‘helped’ not only by the trade policy but also
by government’s use of monetary expansion to finance the
Treasury deficit .
This disastrous intervention contrasted sharply with
more positive, if timid, moves to provide industry with
long-term loans. The first endeavour in this direction
came in 1937, through Banco do Brasil, aiming at
extending medium andlong-term credit for the purchase
of machinery and equipment. However, most of the loans
ended up going for agriculture (Malan et al. 1980). A
second attempt came only in 1952, with the already
mentioned establishment of the BNDE. Industry,
however, had to wait until the mid-1950s to benefit froma significant share of its loans, and even then the lion’s
share went for the government-owned heavy industries(table A.11).
Finally, S&T and education continued not to figure
among the government's priorities, even tough
important, if uncoordinated, steps were taken in this
direction. In the case of the S&T infrastructure, the pre-
1930 trend of establishing isolated institutions in
Se
22 In the Pre-WWIIperiod it was well below twodigits. The M2/GDP1985peel ae Fea to 34% during 1930-45 ba fell to 19 oh inng to the accelerati
‘
period Cae lesoma e ration of the inflation in the post-war
18
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military-strategic areas continued2°, but two new
‘ne(iinboneie National Research Council (CNPQ) and
the Campaign for the Improvement of the Higher
Education Staff (CAPES)—were set up in 1951, with the
more functional aim to finance investments in human
capital. As to education, the establishment of National
Service for Industrial Apprenticeship (SENAI) was an
important and successful initiative in the area of
vocationaltraining.24 Overall, though, no substantial
improvement appears to have occurred. As of 1950, 50%
of the population wasstill illiterate, and only 40%of the
literate population had completed the first five grades of
elementary education (table A.15).
In all, it can be said that government intervention
played an important, if incoherent and largely
unintentional, part in this first stage of Brazil's
industrialization. In the pre-1930 period, fiscal
considerations seem to largely explain the tariffProtection given to manufacturing, which, nonetheless,appears to have been instrumental in allowing Brazil’slong suppressed comparative advantages in the lightindustry to developed. Little else was done, though, totackle other market failures. After the Great Depression,government intervention clearly increased but, again, BPand growth considerations seem to have been the mainMotivation. As in the Previous period, the local induswas protected, but this time, by imposing NTBs and by
SENAI was establishind S ed in 1942, financed by a ay-roll tax ondustrial firms with 500 or more employees. See World Bank(1979), "
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discouraging exports with an overvalued exchangerate,
the government virtually eliminated the healthy pressure
and guidance provided by international prices and
competition. These policy mistakes were compounded by
€ government's timid and sometimesill-advised action
in key areas such as infrastructure, finance, S&T and
education. As a result, the local industry not only lacked
incentives to go down the learning curve, but it also had
to face social-overhead and financial costs above the
international average.
I-Heavy Industry ‘at all costs’: The 1956-64 period.
As shown above, more than half a century of
‘unintentional’ and inward looking industrialization had
good results in terms of growth but gave rise to a
manufacturing sector of dubious quality, threatening to be
‘forever young’ given the lack of the right incentives, and
the burden of serious bottle-necks in infrastructure,
financing and humancapital. However, it was not until the
mid-1950s that the government acknowledged that
industrialization was part of its agenda, and was not untilthe mid-1960s that the benefits of a more open economy
were taken in.
The ‘Targets Plan’ (‘T’ plan)}—1956-61—marked the
former event. Influenced by pro-industrialization
arguments of the structuralists, the Plan, rather than
being an integrated comprehensive program, was a
collection of five-year targets for output and investment ininfrastructure, heavy industry, food and education. As
Suggested by the make-up of the targets, the intentionwas to deal not only with functional market failures, butSo to carry on with IS in the intermediate, capital anddurable-consumer goodS sectors. In the end, functional(transportandeased.nt practice, to infrastructure
, e foodreceiving a perfunctory 6.6 % of the proposed iveation
20
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(no mention was made of finance or S&T). The bulk of
the investment wentinto IS.25
The decision to launch the plan was not accompanied
by significant institutional changes. Even though a
National Development Council, with the initial purpose of
acting as a central planning agency, was set up in 1956,it
was soon fragmented into several sectoral agencies, the
so-called ‘executive groups’. The program remained then
with little central coordination, except for the measures
taken by the BNDE and SUMOC(sort of central bank),
imposed by the financial and macroeconomic
constraints.2
This institutional weakness was compounded by an
inhospitable macroeconomic environment, particularly
inappropriate to a plan whose expending programs would
amount to about 5% of GDP in the following five years.27
On the external front, an erratic export performance
compounded by
a
rising debt-service and falling terms of
trade, suggested little room for the increase in imports
implicit in the plan’s investments. In the domestic front,
inflation was above two digits reflecting not only the
already high GDPrate of growth (8% in 1955), but also, as
 
25 The plan also envisaged the construction of the new capital,Brasilia. The total proposed29.69 investment had 43.4 % going for energy,
edeertrardoa: 32% for food production anddistribution, 3.4% for
an 4%
important targeted see or the heavy industry. As to the latter, the most
tors were steel, cement, automobile, shipbuildin ,and 6ne See Lessa (1982: 35). P .The executive rougovernment representay PS were made up of private sector and
ives of the various agencies providing financeand incentives for the relevantimplementation ofthe : sector. They had the task of overseeing the
ectoral programs, and of su esting fiscal andnancial incentives. See Lessa (loss) for details. ee e "Sochaczewski and Orenstein (1990:1 78).
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Suggested earlier, the lack of proper funding for the state
and private investments. In order to circumvent thesemacroeconomic and institutional constraints, thegovernment went again for an eclectic policy mix, stilldominated by trade and exchange rate policies, but thistime, other important ingredients were added, i.e.,incentives to foreign capital and an expanded governmentParticipation in infrastructure, intermediary goodsindustry and in the financial sector.
The government policies
Beginning with trade and exchange rate policies, therewaslittle change in the overall orientation. These policiescontinued to serve the dual purposeof avoiding a balanceof payment crisis and promoting IS, and therefore,competitive imports continued to be kept out, while thenon-competitive remained subsidised by exports. The aimto deepen the industrial structure, though, meant thatthe non-competitive group had to be streamlined evenfurther to increase protection for the heavy industry.There wasalso a refinement on the instruments used. In
revived custom tariffs and reformed the exchange rate-auction system. Ad valorem tariffs were introduced,Tanging from O to 150 %, and auction Categories werereduced from five to two low (non-competitive producergoods) and high premium (consumer goods) groups. Theaverage effective purchase-power-parity (PPP) exchangeTate for imports, though, continued to be substantially
22
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higher than that of exports (table A.17).28 Moreover, the
‘law of similar’ was eventually putofficially into effect.29
The net effect of these changes was a rise in
protection, now consisting not only of the high premiums
of the exchange rate auctions but also of generallyprohibitive tariff rates.39 Table A.20 shows that all
manufacturing sectors had very high effective tariff rates,
with the structure of protection reflecting ‘essentially’
rather than comparative advantages.
The nowtraditional policy of trade and exchange raterestrictions, though, was not enough to keep the planafloat. Given the import intensity, and the capital andtechnological requirements of the heavy industry targets,. anew element had to be broughtin:i.e. foreign capital. Tothis end, the government reformed the already liberallegislation, dropping the remaining restrictions andcreating lavish incentives.3! In addition to thederegulation of remittances (profits, interest anddividends), sectors of ‘special interest’ could benefit froma preferential, notably, overvalued exchange rate (withregistration of the Principal at the ‘free’ market rate).
ee
28 EXports continued to have product-s ecific exchange rates up to1959, whentheir proceeds w A : e P
ere allowed to be sold on the fr e market.al vy the 1950s trade policies see Bersgman (1970) and Doellinger et
 
30 Oneestimate puttariffs for the goods in the general category up tocategoplus 15% of average premium, and for the ones in the special(Bergsman 1 970:33)." Ng up to 150% plus a premium of 100 to 200%
Until 1953 the restrict
i
Clion to foreign capital were limited toheywereatrictonetze and in the financial sector but even therenforced,remittances tn 1946 a d 1959 There were attempts to control and limitbut only survived for a brief period. For
details see Abreu (1990:101) and Guimaraeset al. (1982, Appendix A.)
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This process was crowned by Instruction 113 vewhich authorised foreign investors to import Seoeswithout exchange rate cover.32 On the requirementsi F
investments had to be in the targeted sectors (virtually amanufacturing sectors) and a programme for comes=
procurementof inputs had to be agreed, to name but the
more important.
This legislation combined, on the one hand, with thethreat of loss of Brazil's fast growing and highly protectemarket, and on the other hand, with the virtually non-
existent local capital market, had an immediate effect onthe amountof foreign capital flowing into Brazil. TableA.12 showsthat annual FDI surged in 1956, and supplierscredits rapidly became the major source of autonomouscapital, accounting for more than two thirds of the grossinflows over the 1954-61 period.33
The third prong of the government's strategy involved,as noted earlier, an increase in the state’s presence inthe infrastructure, intermediary goods and financialsector. The public sector’s average share of the grossfixed capital formation rose substantially (table A.9), ledby SEs’ investments in the steel industry andinfrastructure.34 Likewise, the public sector's share of
total loans went up from 26 (1951-55) to 36% (1956-63),
32 As the exchange rate for imports were generally higher than the‘free’ market rate, avoidanceof the foreign exchange transaction was asubstantial subsidy. In addition, when these imports were financed, theebt could be also serviced at a preferential exchangerate.Malan andBonelli (1990:37).During 1956-61, g5% of SEs’ investments were in infrastructure
(energy, transportandtel©communication) and 17% in the steel industry.
The remecklaseayered in other manufacturing sectors, mining, financing
24
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whereas as a lender, its share rose from 48 to 57% overthe same period. 35
Leaving for the moment the financial aspects aside,these events rather than reveal the government's socialisttendencies, reflect mainly the plan's division of labourbetween the private and public sector, with the lattertaking on the targets where market imperfections(particularly the lack of capital market) virtually ruled outa private solution. This explanation seems to be accurateeven for the intermediate goods sector, where the case ofthe steel industry, which received the mostof the publicsector’s investment in manufacturing, is quite revealing.Although both the size of the Brazilian market and thecharacteristics of the industry's production function(mature technology, inputs which were abundant inBrazil, and the medium-skill requirements) were pointingto static and dynamic Comparative advantages, not eventhe U.S. Steel accepted a government's invitation to setup an integrated steel mil], 36
35 Boletim SUMOC variousyears,See Baer (1969).
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Possibility of issuing foreign-loan guarantees, significantly
increased BNDE resources, it proved to be thoroughlyinadequate to the public and private sector's financialneeds, 37
In the case of the public sector, the lack of adequatefinancing was compounded by the SEs’ unrealistic pricingPolicy, part of an ill-advised attempt by the governmenttocontrol the rising inflation. As an increase in the national
debt was not a viable option (the ‘usury law’ preventedthe government from issuing securities with positivereturns), the gap in the public sector's finances wasalmost entirely financed by monetary expansion under theguise of Banco do Brasil ‘loans’ to the treasury. 38
As to the private sector, whereas foreign firms hadaccess to foreign loans at preferential exchange rates,local firms continued to have problems in arranging long-term financing, due to their diminished creditworthinessin the international financial markets. The BNDE’s loansand guarantees, a possible answerto this problem, had areduced impact since, as indicated, they were meagre
—
37 Table A.11 shows that BNDEloansin the 1956-64 period werelimited in average to 2.2%ofthe gross fixed capital formation.
38 The Treasury deficit rose from 1.2% of GDPin 1955to 5, 1%in 1962(Boletim SUMOC). During 1950-64, Brazil's financial system had a verypeculiar structure, with the monetary authorities being composed ofthree institutions: a) SUMOC,the normative and controlling institution,which performed usual tasks of a traditional central bank,fact that the execution of {ts policies was carried out by the BB.b) the BB,which acted simultaneously as SUMOC executive agent, as the treasuryfinancial agent, and as major commercial bank. Finally, c) the ‘Treasury,
which had the same effect of a pSee Sochaczewski (1980) for details,
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and mostly directed towards the public sector (table
A.11). LPFs continued, then, to resort to auto finance via
higher mark-ups, an option favoured by the lax monetary
policy, but that became increasingly inefficient as inflation
accelerated towards 30% in the late 1950s. Moreover,
the supply of short-term funds wasfurther restricted by
the combination of high inflation with negative interest
rates. The extent of this problem can be gauged by the
fact that, in real terms, outstanding domestic loans to the
private sector remained stagnant over 1956-61, despite a
two-fold increase of GDP.39
Assessing the results
At first sight, the Plan's overall results point to aremarkable success. As table 3 shows, mostofthe targets,either in infrastructure or manufacturing, were metwithin a reasonable margin of error. In addition, GDPgrew at an annual average rate of 9.4 % (1955-61),whereas the same figure for manufacturing output was12%. IS and industrial diversification were successfullycarried further down the road, notably in the heaindustry, whose import-ratio reached 9 % in 1964 (tableA.7), and whose share of the total manufacturing output,Tose from 35 to 48% over 1955-65 (table A.1).4° Yet,
ee
39
shrat poletin SUMOC,various years. The financial sector continued to3494 ‘Ee the financial-asset-io-GDPratlo falling from 45%in 1956 toincreasing! 64 (Goldsmith 1986:245). At the end of the 1950s. thesystem led raat supply offinance by the insttutionalised bankingabout 5% of { © appearanceofa curb market, which in 1963/64 reacheddetails, otal bank credit. See Sochaczewski (1980, chap 6) for40 . .
deiner ah end-use Perspective, the capital goods sector almostintermediary goods or the manufacturing output, while durable andalso expanded their particinon-durable consumer geone (table A ) part pation at the expense of
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impressive as these results might be, one of the Plan's
main objectives—the decision to a speedy move into the
heavy industry—can be seriously questioned if the options
 
involved, and the results achieved, are examined more
carefully.
Table _3: Targets Plan. Selected Targets and Performance (1956-61
planned achieved
Electric Power (105KW) 5000 5205
Oil production (103barrels per day) 100 95.4Railways (Km) 1624 1093Roads (Km) 12000 13169
Steel ingots ( 10> tons per year) 2300 1843
Cement(10° tons per year) 5000 4678
Pass. Cars (10>units and localization index) 58 (95%) 52 (89%)
Shipbuilding (capac.1037DWT per year) 160 158
 
Source: Data from Lessa (1982) exceptfor steel production (achieved) which is from
Baer (1969)  
One can begin by arguing that in the mid-1950s therewas hardly a sound casefor a hasty and massive move intoheavy industry. Looking first from a static point of view,Brazil was far from any Lewisian turning point asdemonstrated by the falling unit labourcosts (table A.13).Factor prices, therefore, were Suggesting that resourceallocation would be improved not by widespread targetingof heavy industry, but by giving light industry the rightincentives and financial means to ‘grow’ and sell in theinternational market (whose access in the mid-Fifties wasno longer restricted). Instead, as we have seen, not onlexports continued to be discriminated, but the lightindustry was almost completely left out of BNDE long-term loans (table A.11). As a result, both manufacturinemployment growth andits elasticity were halved ata
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time when almost half of the economically active
population was under-employed.4!
dynamic and, say, ‘strategic’ perspective, it is
truethata move towards the heavy industry wasjustified,
first, by the possibility of exploiting dynamic economies of
scale, particularly in technologically mature sectors, and
second because of the human capital spillovers, higher
productivity and above-the-average-cost profits, usually
associated with this industry. However, it seems that in
order to take full advantage of these benefits, any attempt
in this direction would have allow for the limitations of
the existing resource endowment, and for the market
failures and imperfections that affect competition in this
industry. This, not only to prevent benefits being offset by
excessive resources misallocation, in the static sense, but
also to give LPFs realistic chances to grow and compete.
Yet, as we have seen, the government overlooked allthese considerations. Despite Brazil's poor capital andhuman capital resources, several heavy industry sectorswere targeted at once. Notwithstanding
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domestic market, backward integration, through
domestic content incentives, was excessively pursued.
And finally, notwithstanding the industry's high
technological and skill requirements, improvements in
the S&T and education remained out of the government's
agenda.42 It was as if all these constraints and
preconditions could have been quickly overcome by a
large and unregulated inflow of FDI, thought to be in
itself, a guarantee of efficiency. True enough, the targets
were met and manufacturing growth was high, yet thecosts seemed to have been too high.
Even though the analysis of FDI costs and benefits
tends to be controversial, there seems to be a rare
consensusin the literature regarding the inapplicability of
the infant industry argument to TNC affiliates.43 Whereas
there is no doubt that these firms also face a learning
curve, and generate pecuniary and non-pecuniary
externalities, their unrestricted access to capital and
technology in the international market does not make
them legitimate candidates for protection. The more so if
one takes into account,first, that their access to parent
company technology tends to exclude the ‘know why’
from their contribution to domestic technological
capabilities (Lall 1992); second, that foreign ownership
 
42 In fact, between 1956 and the end of the 1960s, the already poorS&T infrastructure fell into decline because of lack of governmentsupport. See Bielschowsky (1978). As to education, progress continued tobe sluggish (table A.15), despite some successin the areas of technicaland vocational training, mainly through the SENAI. Leff (1968:61),
tal goods industry in 1963 argued that ‘thesupply of engineers has not keep pace with the demands of the laboursyatent Principally becauseof insufficient expansion of the educational
43
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invalidates the welfare gains related to the ‘profit-
shifting’ argument (Brander 1986); and third, that their
protection is hardly compatible with that of those who
really need to ‘mature’, i.e., the LPFs.
Therefore, even though heavy reliance on ‘protected’,
inward-looking, and unregulated FDI allowed the
government to ignore the resource and technological
constraints, and LPFs’ human capital and financial needs,
it ended up compromising much of the dynamic benefits
involved in a move into the heavy industry. In fact, b
taking this ‘short cut’, the governmentcreated a situation
where, on the one hand,the local firms were thoroughly
exposed to the imperfect competition of the affiliates,
and, despite the highly protected internal market, they
had largely to settle for marginal or subcontractor
positions, when not driven out of the market. And, on the
other, the combination of high domestic prices and lax
investment licensing, led to the so-called ‘crowd in’
effect (Horstman and Markunsen 1986). An inefficientindustrial structure was then built—oversized vis-a-vis thedomestic market but with most of the plants below theinternational MES— heavily dependent on permanentprotection, even though most of the heavy industrysectors were either led or totally dominated by the mostefficient producers of the world (table A.8).44
eee
44 The automobile industry is a case in point. Desinvestment was. to pite the fact thata certain extent regulated by the GEIA (Executine ¢ Automobile Industry) no less than 8 firms were assemblingAccorde Cars (including pick-ups) in 1962 (see Bergsman 1970).1967/60 to Suzigan (1978:47) the industry's capacity utilisation untilexcess canes ress than 50%. Leff (1968:29) also reports widespreadi960. pacity in the capital Zoods industry in the beginning of the
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Finally, a more selective approach to the heavy
industry, coupled with neutral trade incentives an
Supported by pro-market intervention in the finance a
market (to overcome market failures not to aggrava
them), would have avoided, in all likelihood, the serious
macroeconomic imbalances of the first half of the 196 S.
During this period, inflation approached three digits, ane
the widening current account deficit had to be finance
by increasingly costly short-term loans.45 This alternative
approach would also have acted in the direction of
avoiding the deep recession that followed the
implementation of the Plan. The rush into the heavy
industry produced an industrial capacity well beyond wha
the internal market could absorb, which, in turn, made a
slow-down in growth inevitable. Greater export
orientation would have allowed growth to go on
irrespective of the limits of the internal market, which
could have become bigger had the resource been used
more efficiently.46
IV-The Pragmatic ‘Miracle’. The 1964-73 period.
The last section has shown that the government'sfirst
conscious attempt to promote industrialization led to a
considerable, and long overdue, improvement in the
country’s infrastructure, and took IS to most of the heavy
industry sectors. Yet, keen on removing the ‘foreign
exchange gap’, the government pursued IS without due
 
45s Malan and Bonelli (1990:38) pointed out, in 1960, Brazil was
sonnyane datgest international debtor among LDCs ($3.9 billion), withof the ebt scheduled to be paid in the following three years. As toinflation, GDP deflator reached 50% in 1962 and 80% in 1964.The real GDP annual growth rate fell from 8.5% in 1961 to 0.6% in1963. For detaiIs of the economiAbreu (1990), mic policy over the 1961-64 period see
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regard for the resource endowments, and the financial
and technological requirements. Exports continued to be
unduly discriminated, and foreign capital was invited in to
fill the micro and macroeconomic gaps, often at expense
of the LPFs. The side effects of this strategy did not take
long to show their ‘ugly face’. The lack of proper
financing and thetradebias, led to high inflation and a BP
crisis, which coupled with the polarisation of the political
situation, resulted eventually in a military coup, in 1964.
A new team of neoclassical policy makers, then, took over
the command of the economy.
Apparently utterly opposed to the interventionist ideas
that had inspired its predecessors, the new team set out
to implement comprehensive institutional and policy
reforms that would spark off a new period of rapidindustrial and economic growth. Even though the reforms
were aimed at restoring ‘the supremacy of the pricemechanism’, in practice, as we shall see, theoreticalPrinciples quickly gave way to a puzzling pragmatism,which has not fundamentally altered either thegovernment’s role or the previous pattern ofindustrialization. The refo
deal with two Major issues—the inadequacy of the publicand private sector financing, and the incentive-biasagainst exports and foreign capital—thought to have beenthe underlying causes of the chronic inflationary and BPproblems. Moreover, at a less prominent level, there werealso changes in the industrial and S&T ‘policies’.
Reforming public and private sector Jinancing
Looking first at the public sector, a fiscal r, eform wimplemented to modernise taxes and protect fiscal
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revenue from inflation, the SEs’ prices were adjusted,
and earmarked, compulsory saving funds were set up to
finance investments in infrastructure and housing. In
addition, a central bank was finally created47, and the
treasury was allowed to issue bonds with monetary
correction. As Sochaczewski (1980:360) pointed out, this ©
last measure allowed the government to circumvent the
‘usury law’, whose 12% ceiling was now reinterpreted as
referring to the real and not the nominalrate. As a result,
the state improved its control over the monetary policy,
and significantly increased its resources, which became
more in line with its new responsibilities in the
infrastructure and intermediary goods industry, whose
legitimacy was not questioned by the newcomers. On the
contrary, SEs increased investment in these areas,
doubling their share of the gross fixed capital formation
over 1965-73 (table A.9).
As to the private sector, new non-banking financial
institutions and assets were created, and old ones
reformed. The principal innovation was the introduction
of assets with monetary correction, which, as with public -
bonds, would allow interest rates to be positive.48 These
new assets were to be part of a specialised financial
market, with commercial banks and credit societies
supplying, respectively, short term and consumercredit :
and the stock and debenture markets, supported by fiscal
incentives, the long awaited long-term funds. In this task,
they would have the support of the newly created
 
47 See footnote 57. BB, though retained its double role as thegovernment's financial agent and major commercial bank, continuing tocompromise the transparency of the government's accounts.For details, see Sochaczewski (1980) and World Bank (1984).Although positive, interest rates continued tgovernmentuntil 1974. © be controlled by the
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investment banks, authorised to undertake underwriting
operations, and to supply medium term working-capital.
Foreign loans were also to be another important source of
medium, long-term capital, and new legislation was
enacted to expedite these operations (see below). The
immediate impact of these measures was a substantial
increase in financial savings that rose from 16 to 26% of
GDP (1965-73), sustained by a two-fold increase in the
financial-asset-to-GDP ratio and a stock-market boom.42
Reforming the trade regime and foreign capital
policy.
Beginning with the trade regime, the government
gradually moved towards a unified exchange rate via
devaluation (table A.17), and removal of most of theNTBs.°° In addition, a crawling-peg system was adopted,
aiming at curbing speculation and reducing the real
exchangefluctuations. These measures were accompaniedby the implementation of export incentives, and by aselective import liberalisation. On the export side,manufactured exports were exempted from indirect andincome taxes, granted product-specific fiscal subsidies, asystem of drawback was implemented, and heavilySubsidised export credits were made available31 Exports
 
49 World Bank (1984:1 1). Real savings thou711 . gh increased only s|from 16% (1956-64) to 18% (1965-73) (IBGE 1990). Th Yay ent.e tot l stockmarket value, as percentage of GDP, increased fi 01971. (Goldsmith 1986:429), rom 3% in 1968 to 41% in
industry” indirect lax exemption involved the IP] (federal tax onadded taxes, ucts), d the ICM (state turnover tax). Both are value-» and the formervaries according to the type of product. The
cont.
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responded quickly, particularly manufactured exports,which grew at an average annual rate of 29% over the
period, with an almostfive-fold increase in their share o
total exports (table A.6)
On the import side, apart from the already mentionedtariff exemptions for export production and the removaof most NTBs, tariffs were reduced with themanufacturing average falling from 99 to 66% over 1966-
73.52 In addition, tariff exemptions were extended ‘a
Capital goods imports of ‘priority’ sectors, irrespective Oothe market targeted, and an ‘import processing zone’ wascreated in the Amazon region, which allowed theassemble products (mainly electric and electronic
consumer goods) for the domestic market with inputs
close to the international prices. However, legal and
effective protection remained rather high and its inter-
industrial structure unchanged (tables A.20 and A.18).
The changes in import composition and the modest
increase in import ratios (tables A.4 and A. 7) suggest thatnon-competitive, producer-goods imports, given thetariff
 
fiscal subsidies took the form of a tax credit equivalent to a percemlage orthe IPI and ICM exempted. These incentives were limitemanufactured and semi-manufactured goods. For details see, e.eDoellingeret al. (1974) and Tyler (1976). Export credits were given mainlyto pre-shipmentactivities, for a maximum of one year, and were supplieby the commercial banks that had accessto unlimited rediscounts at theCentral Bank. See Baumann and Braga (1985).The 1967 tariff reform almost halved legal tariffs for mostmanufactured sectors. However, B
in 1968 led to a revision ofis reform, which ended up mo
levels below to those of 1966 (Table A.1to make a pre-
(1977) for details.
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and tax exemptions, were largely the sole beneficiaries of
the liberalisation. 53
t to foreign investment, the governmentwasquicktp‘alter Law 4131 (1962), one of the last acts of
the civilian government, which, inter alia, restrictedprofit remittances to 10% of the capital, and for the first
time tried to screen and limit technology imports. Mostof these restrictions were, then, dropped (Law 4390), buta supplementary income tax was levied on remittancesthat exceeded 12 % of the registered capital.54 As before,the manufacturing sector continued to be totally open toFDI. As to foreign loans, even though they still requiredCentral Bank authorisation, there were no restrictions onthe borrower's nationality or sector of activity. In fact, theaccess to foreign loans was further facilitated by two newpieces of legislation: instruction 289 and resolution 63.The former allowed short-term loans to be registered andServiced, and thelatter, granted local banks permissionto raise funds abroad to be reloaned to local firms with aShorter maturity. These measures, in conjunction with©conomic recovery, triggered off a new spurt of FDI (tableA.12), and a rapid growth of the external debt (11%annually over 1965-73),
——
 
53 Table A.4 showsthat, in 1972, the share of consuimports remained negligible, whereas that of Capital goods increased61%. Yet, even in this sector, the growth in imports seem to have beenandthe02competitive, since production grew 13% p.a. over the period,Port ratio has never gone beyond 28%, a level below the 32%
achieved at the end ofthe T Plan, See Bergsman (1970) for the pre-1964nelli and Facanha(1978) for post-1965 data. See also Coesof the 1967-73 trade reforms.‘ ‘ “tm royalty payments remained, but not formadeneaaesistance. iecdition the investmentregistration systemce lor inflation i t
=
et al. (1989)for details. n the country of origin. See Guimaraes
mer goodsin total
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Changes in the industrial and S&T‘policies’.
Despite the policy-makers’ neoclassical credentials,
the uncoordinated group of institutions that were the
tools of the industrial and S&T ‘policies’ during the 'T
plan andearlier, were not wound up but reformed; and as
regards S&T, there was even an attempt to come up with
a strategy worthy of the term. On the industrial side, the
government set up, in 1964, the Industrial Development
Council (CDI), made up of representatives of the main
economic agencies, which were to incorporate the
executive groups (see last section), and to co-ordinate
and establish criteria for the concession of fiscal and
credit incentives to the manufacturing sector. These
initial ambitions, though, have never materialised. CDI’s
incentives were distributed at random, without any clear
criteria, but to increase investments. 55 Moreover, there
were at least a dozen regional and sector-specific
government institutions, conceding similar incentives,
with the CDI having little or no control over them.
As to S&T, it finally became, in 1968, an explicit policy
aim. The government eventually came to the conclusion
that IS was not enough to assure ‘self-sustained
development’ and that it had to be complemented by the
development of local technological capabilities.5° A
 
55 until 1970, these incentives included: exemption from indirect andimport taxes for capital goods imports, access to subsidised credit fromstate banks such as BNDE, and accelerated depreciation for income taxPurposes to buyers of local capital goods. After 1970, the latter weregranted exemption from indirect taxes, fiscal credit. See Suzigan (1978).During 1969-74, the projects which received CDI i entives averaged82% of the total manufact tr, ¥ C
uring iReports). & investment (Cen al Bank Annual
56. s .1963 Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento’. Presidéncia da Republica.
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National System of Scientific and Technological
Development (SNDCT) was then set up, which would co-
ordinate the existing S&T institutions, formulate S&T
development plans, and would be funded by the National
Fund for Scientific and Technological Development
(FNDCT). Particular emphasis was given to the need to
develop more appropriate technologies to Brazil's
resource endowment. This move was soon followed by anew emphasis on higher education, and by thereintroduction of the screening of technology imports(1971), whose responsibility fell to a new agency, INPI(National Institute of Industrial Property Rights).Thealleged motivation of this last measure was reduce thecost of technology imports and to facilitate its absorption.Its impact, though, would only be felt in earnest in thenext period, in so far as it did not affect the contracts inforce,°7
Behind the ‘miracle’
As noted befor
period of exceptional growth. During 1965-73, GDP grewal rate 10%, whereas manufacturinoutput reached 11%. The latter was spearheaded by the
resource allocation, with




A.10). There was also a considerable reduction in inflation
that ‘ell from around 90 to 16% over 1964-70, reflecting
not only the reforms examined above, but a 0 a eh
heterodox stabilisation program (1964-67), ‘right
combined a ‘stop-and-go’ monetary policy wit oP too
intervention in the labour market.5® Finally, the F also
improved—helped by the export take-off an rail
substantial inflow of foreign capital—showing an ove
Surplus in the whole period, except for 1967.
fThese impressive results prompted largely two sorts 0
reading. First, that they reflected industry reaching rs
maturity and, therefore, vindicated the previous the
strategy, and second, that they were the results o aé
adoption of an outward-looking trade regime.
Apparently contradictory, these interpretations canbe
easily reconciled, if we argue, for instance, that tre
‘miracle’ would not have been possible, without, on rs
one hand, the capacity and capability building of the IS
period, and, on the other hand, the incentive changes
andfinancial and fiscal reforms that put them to good use.
Yet, even when cobbled together, these views can be
misleading for two interrelated reasons. First, because
 
see Resende (1990). Until the 1960s,
roverotheStabllizal‘in peebour market had been limited to labour
union legislation (1931) and to the introduction of a minimum wage
(1940). In 1965, the military government introduced a ‘wage formu a
bringing public and private sector nominal wages underits control.
According to this formula, wages were to be adjusted once a year
according to the government's expected inflation, plus a productivity-
related bonus. As the former was consistently underestimated, the
average real wage fell 9% between 1965-67. In 1968, this formula was
changed with wages being indexed not to the expected but to the pastinflation.
59 See, eg., Tyler (1976) on the former, and Balassa (1979) on thelatter.
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. despite being instrumental for export and economic
growth,IS policies left a legacy that made a move towards
a more open economy costlier and economic growth
unsustainable. And second, because, it gives the wron
impression the reforms have successfully tackled the key
shortcomings of Brazil's industrialization ‘strategy’, i.e.,
its excessive inward-orientation, lack of selectivity,
inadequate finance, and lack of investment in education
and S&rT.
In order to clarify these points, we can begin by
looking at the changesin the trade regime andits results.
Whereas there is no doubt that the reforms reduced the
bias against exports, they fell well short of turning Brazilinto an outward-oriented economy. Growth accounting










be encouraged, and“nce increasingly at expense of the
Osean
nenSee Serra (1982) and Tavares and Beluzzo (1982).
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local firms.6! With protection still high, the exchane rtsremained overvalued. In other words, notwithstan ing forliberal inclinations, the government instead of go henge
an across-the-board liberalisation, leaving the eel ctiverate to bear the burden of the adjustment, andse’ the
protection and relative prices to restructu intainmanufacturing sector, the option was to Mending
protection high enough not to upset the sidies to(inefficient) industrial structure, and to use subs
reducethe bias against exports.
llyile an apparently similar strategy was successfu
pursuedby other NICssuch as Korea (see chapter ain
Brazil, even though it succeeded in expan ne
manufactured exports, it turned out to be rather cos y
(table A.24), and did not make exports more than a Poo
alternative to internal sales. The reasons for eaams ‘9
lie not so much in Brazil’s ‘continental’ market ©, ut in
three other factors: (a) Whereas Korea made protection
and incentives to industrialization conditional on export
performance, Brazil relied solely on export subsidies; (b)
Whereas in Korea, IS wasselective, plants were built at
international scale, and exporters were given full access
to inputs at international prices; in Brazil, IS lacked
selectivity, plants were built below the MES, and given
 
61 Table A.28 showsthat in 1971, TNCs accounted for more than poe
of the heavy industry sales, and for 45% of those of the w vole
manufacturing sector. Morley and Smith (1971) estimated thatin pees
this last figure was 33.5%. Moreover, whereas during 1956-60, 33% o
based TNCs wereset up via take-overs of local firms, this percentagerose to 52% during 1966-70, and to 61% during 1971-72. (Newfarmer1979).
62 Germany and Canada, €.g., whose GDPs in 1970 were respectively4.5 and 2.0 times bigger than Brazil's, had export-to-GNP ratios morethan twice higher (18.5% in Germany and 20.4% in Canada, against 7.1%in Brazil (OECD 1989).
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ion of its ‘drawback’ scheme, exporters had to
shoulden the burden of an excessively|backward-
integrated industrial structure (table A.24), And, (c)
Unlike Korea, Brazil relied heavily on ‘protected’ FDI, astrategy that made export diversification easier, but that
restricted mainly to intra-firm trade the access to theimportant developed country markets, in view of parent -
subsidiary arrangements. ©4
This last characteristic of Brazil's strategy also raisesdoubts about the economic justification behind hea
orts. In contrast to the LPFs’
, the more so becausetheir protection was far from justifiable.
In short, in spite of the reforms, Brazil continued witha trade regime that reflect neitherdynamic comparative advantages, bu
&mented industrial structure imposingheavy costs to the treasy
'
neverreally became Ty. Moreover, as export success
id not exert the necessary pr
=>
3 DrawbacK users, until 1975, would lose
and both drawback incentives and export cr
part of the fiscal Subsidy,localiiooe sation indices above 70% (Pastore et al
edits were conditional on- 1979:75 and Guimaraes64 Fajnzylber o€xports were to De. abi aed Hatin 1967,
)
quoting ECLA/UN. anes €xports were done bta, put the share of intra-
erican TNCs based in Brazil, at 700 in 1977. ntra-firm exports from
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the learning curve, and for the industrial structure to find
more efficient and sustainable configurations.
For not increasing the economy outwardorientation.Brazil also missed the opportunity to have3 bettersustainable economic growth, combined with trace’
resource allocation. As suggested earlier, the dle
was very muchbuilt on the indebtednessof a tiny m bleclass®6, which could not keep on accumulating allthegoods at 22% annual rate forever: and for a i's
improvements in labour absorption, Braz itsmanufacturing sector continued to employ, vis-a-visshare of GDP,far less labour than its capital-intensive DCs
counterparts.®7
m the trade regime, there are two other
pointeworth making concerning the financial reforms,
and investments in S&T and education. As to the former,
while they were successful in improving the state’s
finances, and in providing funds for current activities,
they failed to eradicate inflationary financing and to
provide industry with a proper source of long-term funds.
Inflation has never gone below 16%, and indexation was
 
dy of65 ble in Baumols'(1982) sense. For instance, a 1973 stu y
the machinery sector by an Italian consultancy firm, revealed that
productivity in most productlines was well below thatofItaly, r rause.
inter alia, plants were below the MES andlack specialisation (Villela an
Baer 1980).
According to Hoffman (1989:217) 42% of the population in 1970
was below the‘poverty line’, defined as the prevailing minimum wage.
Despite being more labour-intensive than importables (seeCarvalho and Haddad, 1981), the export contribution to greater labourabsorption was limited, given its small share oftotal sales. In 1974, themanufacturing’s share of GDP was 14.4% greater than its share of
was -0.8%, and -3.3
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too clever by half. True, it allowed interest rates to be
positive, and reduced the worst inflationary effects upon
the government's income and the creditors’ and Savers’
assets. Yet, those on fixed incomes continued to suffer,and as indexation swiftly spread throughout the economy(exchange rate, wages), relative price changes becameincreasingly difficult, since they were quickly fed intomonetary correction and passed on to other prices. Moreto the point, in so far as indexation made the pastinflation the floor to future price rises, inflation gotincreasingly resistant to any sort of therapy.
olicy was less than helpful. Thecombination of high
assets, made long-
even riskier, 68 He
to be the only so
term investment in non-
nce, BNDEandforeign loans continuedurces of long-term funds. Even thoughources was increased,first by expandinand redirecting BNDE loans to the private sector, and
indexed assets
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internal and inflationary financing for their capacity
expansion, a conduct that curtailed their clamess&
growth and diversification. Not surprisingly, ie ioea
firm's share of the top 25 and 500 firms’ sales in ee
was zero and a mere 39%, respectively (Exame, vari
issues).
As for education, investments in basic skills eon
to be inadequate. As of 1970, the illiteracy rate was oot
high, and less than halfof theliterate population eS
had elementary education (table A.15). Apart from ;
implications for industry’s efficiency, the continuation a
scarcity conditions in the market for skilled worker
seems to have contributed—together with the economy's
product mix and the high-inflation-cum-indexation
policies—for the worsening of income distribution
experienced during the 1960s.69
in spite of SNDCT investments, R&D
expendiinves rematned limited even by LDC's standards
(table A.31), and the fact that investments cameonly after
the heavy industry wasset-up, and since the latter was
done mainly through ‘protected’ FDI, posed the problem
of who would demand the top quality human capital,
technologies and infrastructure that the SNDCT was
proposing to deliver. This would hardly come from either
the TNCs or LPFs. The former, because of their
advantageous access to the parent’s company
Se
69 as Lago (1990:286) pointed out, skilled workers during the ‘miracle’had wagerises well above those of the non-skilled workers. As to incomedistribution, the share of the 20% highest income group increased from55%in 1960 to 62% in 1970 (IBGE 1990).
46
Industlalization and Interventions.Brazil.
technology.7° And the latter be
located in the light industry, where technolo
V- Heavy Industry Revisited: the 1974-79 Period
Forall its shortcomings primaril r it
, ly for its narrof growth, the Pragmatic ‘miracle’ could not last
Ow basebut it took the oil shock in 1973
for long,
to convince the
concurre nvestments in th€s€ areas, which :growth7100Y Promote hstructural adjus
0
Ina Slud fGuimaraes (19 Y Of foreign techno] .< 73) rey, nology contracts52% of which consisting4 at the TNCs’ share Invalue Biato andfor 879, 91974. raw mat ‘ Tenesubsidiary deals.” ‘TMS was 73%,T 87% © ota rial, intern .ir a nediate aninvestments in hanes (Table A.4). The ce yopital §00ds accountedNSport and communication also envisage substantial
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i revious ISEven thoughit all looks vey much SENE thal
: e new eleme 4s, amd a
sideected Bonohegre treatmentfor aa the
more¢ sistent approach to makeSins.emat
government seemed to have come eee then iigert
fore is more to infant industry promo laa emphasised
tection and FDI. For instance, the Pp Hon with the
the 1 ed to carry out IS in conjunctio vereiates,
7 tion of exports and local private congo! ale,
capable of competing against TNCs bene Meare also
fenimDlagyriiivencive heavy Sotpinmatine sustainable
medeet if teetecheolseical capabilities, and
chant the role of the TNCs. The latter were fn
See to increase exports, carry out ae a See in
igenton instead of taking-over local inns. ois, mt
Tehee een continuing their investme a ee
inirastracee “and in key basic input industries ohne =
cielToMIneers basic Foeattidehee ‘aialeey
Befor ing Its o is = 'discuss g the resul
though, let us look at its policy mix.
Trade and exchangerate policies
t, in theThe adjustments in the trade Fnchetee term. tot term, to avoid a BPcrisis, and in i thie’ odes otSy eae] d to promote exports, 1 exchange rateimportance.Right SE ae aeidrounds, fish, tint idevaluation eseeenfee widespread haeenoewould be ineffec inflation, and second, tha it w swould iciaa on externally indebted firms, animpose heavy
 
72 1: Nacional de Desenvolvimento. BrasilII Plano C ia. Fora thorough
analysis, see Batista (1992).
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discourage further borrowing abroad.73 Hence, the bulk ofthe changes was in the trade policy. On the import side,
r were
lariff and taxexemptions, a stricter interpretation of the ‘law of
Similar’ (notably for SEs), and by the imposition of
tougher localisation indices and + articipation
agreements’ on projects benefiting from CD] incentives,
In addition, the fiscal] incentives available for
manufactured exports were extended to domestic Sales of
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to ‘suggest’ long-term export agreements (so-called
BEFIEX), particularly to foreign firms, as a pre-condition
to exempt capital goods imports from tariffs and NTBs. 76
This increase in incentives more than offset the
appreciation of the official exchange rate, keeping the
PPP-export rate well above the 1973 level (table A.17).
Financial policies
The financial side of the II NDP did not involve any
significant institutional change, and the traditionalcombination of ‘policy’ loans, foreign capital incentivesand a permissive attitude towards inflation continued tohold sway. There were, though, some adjustments. BNDEresources were beefed up by compulsory saving funds,allowing a significant increase in manufacturing loans,with the heavy industry and LPFs being the majorbeneficiaries.77 The subsidy implicit in these loans wasalso increased, notably during 1975-76 whentheinteresttate charged became sharply negative.78 In addition, newBNDEprogramswereset up, seeking to offer competitive
—
These agreements, first used in 1972, allowed firms to importequipment and Inputs, tax and NTB free (on top of the regular exportincentives), in return for a commitment to reach export targets over along-term period (usually 10 years). Imports of inputs were limited toone-third of the value exported. BEFIEX share of manufactured exportsrose from 9% in 1974 to 17% in 1979. TNCs in the transport equipmentSector accounted for 87% of these exports (1974-79 A
jee P ) (Guimaraes
77 Table A.11 showsthat the bank's approved manufacturing loanswere equivalent to 43% of the manufacturing investment during theperiod. Yet, the figure for loans effectively disbursed was a great dealmore modest, averaging 28%.





finance for the purchase of locally made capital goods;
and to capitalise and ‘equity strengthen the EES.
particularly in the capital goods and basic input sectors.”
for foreign capital, there was a certain swing
tommdepartielle investments (table A.12), with some
restrictions being imposed on FDI (see below). Yet, both
forms of investment kept on growing rapidly. The average
annual inflow of FDI during the period (US$ 1.1 billion)
was well above that of the ‘miracle’ (US$ 0.2 billion),
whereas the external debt trebled to US$ 50 billion in
1979. This exceptional increase in foreign borrowing
resulted largely from the government's strategy of using
the cheap Eurocurrency funds available, to finance the
plan’s investments and the BP. This strategy involved the
concession of foreign borrowing incentives, the
liberalisation of domestic interest rates in 1976, and, as
noted earlier, a passive exchange rate policy.8° Unlike
BNDEcredits, though, there was no atlempt to control
the allocation of these loans, which were supposed to be
8uided by relative prices. This, despite the distortions
Provoked by the trade policy, and high-inflation-cum-
indexation.
Finally, the government continued to look at inflation
as a necessary evil, a price worth paying for growth and
Structural adjustment. To be sure, there were attempts to
ee
9 Subsidised finance to the purchaseoflocally-made capital goodshad been on offering since 1964 by the BNDE subsidiary FINAME.However,it received a major boost in 1974, when a new programtargeting© made-to-order sector was set up. Onthe capitalisation programs, seeVillela and Baer(1980).
fi Foreign borrowing incentives included reductions in the loansnimum maturity, fiscal concessions on interest rale payments, andthe
SecmPtion by the Central Bank ofa portion ofthe exchangerate risks.Tuz (1984) and World Bank (1984).
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pursue a tight monetary policy but, as the finance
minister of the day put it, “[uhey were] soon abandoned
because wage-indexalion was considered to be
encouraging the wage-price spiral. Eventually the
government chose monetary accommodation, which kept
the annual inflation rates in the range of 30-40 a year
until 1978.”(Simonsen 1988:293) This ‘stabilisation’ of
the inflation rate was, to large extent, achieved at the
cost, first, of a substantial increase in the government's
internal debt, issued to finance policy loans, and to offset
the monetary expansion provoked by the massive foreign
capital inflow. And second, of compromising the SEs’
financial position with an unrealistic pricing policy.8!
Industrial and S&T policies
Part of what can be understood as the II NDP industrial
Policy was already discussed above, and involved greater
Protection and an increased amount of subsidised credit
to the capital goods and basic input industries, in general,
and for LPFs, in particular. These measures were
Supposed to be part of a broader strategy, which, as
Suggested earlier, aimed not only at carrying out IS butalso at fostering large LPFs, sustainable market structures,
and technological capabilities. Leaving for the momentthe latter aside, the pursuanceof the first two objectiveswasleft to the discretion of the government's loosely co-ordinated ‘army’ of federal, sectoral and regional
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‘incentive’ agencies—which still had the CDI formally on
top—and to BNDE andSEs(through procurement). 82
These institutions, though, tended to have different
interpretations of what would be a LPF or a sustainable
market structure, and had different instruments and
capacities to pursue the government's guidelines. As a
result, quite a few policy regimes emerged during the
period, even in technologically related segments of the
capital goods and basic input industries. In somesectors,
strict investment licensing was enforced together with
different sorts of FDI restrictions, ranging from the
imposition of joint ventures (e.g. petrochemicals and
telecommunications equipment) to a complete ban on
foreign firms (e.g. micro and mini-computers). In others—
the great majority—restrictions continued to be limited to
localisation requirements, and the objectives of
promoting LPFs and efficient market structures, were left
to BNDE credit and CDI incentives, despite the obvious
limitations of these institutions.83
As to technological capabilities, investments in S&T
were significantly increased, particularly regarding
graduate education and research. 84 This was combined
with initiatives aiming at financing R&D activities at the
Private firm level, and at imposing stricter controls on
ey
. 82 Public sector procurement was a particularly powerful instrument.
Table A.9 showsthat the state enterprises’ share of gross fixed capital
formation increased to 22% during the period.
crea: Noneofthese institutions could block investments, and BNDE
oo was only relevantfor the LPFs. For a review of the industrial policy
guidigan (1978) andVillela and Baer (1980).
FN _Elementary education, though, conUnued to be neglected. The8 share off e sh avera TEincreased i ederal expenditures, which average 0.4% over 1970-73,
enrolments ata ) over 1974-79 (World Bank 1983, IBGE 1990). Graduate
at annual average rate 18% over 1974-79 (Castro 1989)
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technology imports. The former was done through theconcession of subsidised credit by BNDE and SNDCTinstitutions, and the latter, through new guidelines issued
by the INPI, which made new contracts conditional uponabsorption of technology by the recipient firms.85 Inaddition, the SEs were used to foster the LPFs’iechnological Capabilities by favouring the purchase ofocally developed capital goods, and by offeringtechnological Support through, either their researchinstitutes, or via NAI
=
tidusBe s (centre for co-operation with
The results
The Tesults of this neo-IS strategy are controversial.Enthusiasts claim quite a few successes. They argue,first,that economic growth was kept at a relatively high rate
This was supposed to be done b~ y requiring full disclosure oftechnical knowledge by the licensers, and by Tautliing the licensees to
training. Import of technolog' 5 y ay. though keep, on growing fast. Apercentage of GDPIt averaged 0.3%over the period against 0.2% du jl ;the ‘miracle’. World Bank (1983) and IBGE (1990) mngIn 1975, the governmentset u. p NAls in the mostinaiming al fostering technological links between them aeae SEs,capital goods industry. See Villela (1984). ane’ tthe local
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(6.4%), and exports, notably manufactured exports,
continued to grow fast (6 and 16%, respectively),
substantially increasing their share of world exports (table
A.30). Second, that export growth was accompanied by
diversification towards the heavy industry (table A.1),
partly reflecting the success of IS investments during the
period. Third, that IS contributed not only to export
diversification, but also to reduce dependency on
imported capital goods and basic inputs (table 4),
assisting therefore in the structural adjustment whose
first signs cameoutin the early 1980s. 87
 
Table 4: Selected Results of Il NDP investments.
 
    
 
(a) Capital (b) Rolled Steel
|
(c) Aluminium (d) paper pulp (e) Oil
goods
imp exp. imp exp. imp exp. imp exp. imp
ratio! ratio? ratio ratio ratio rauio ralio Tatio ratio
1974] 29.0 7.0 39.1 2.2 50.4 1.6 16.6 11.8
|
79.7
1978] 20.0 8.0 5.1 5.4 26.3 2.0 4.4 14.8 84.7
1983] 23.0 19.0 1.0 39.1 2.3 40.0 O.8*  27.7* 68.7
1987] 25.0 20.0 0.5 50.7 na. na. nea. na. 52.0    
Timpons divided by domestic su ply. * Exports divided by total production. * 1982. .Source: BNDE(1988b) for (a) , Batista (1992) for (c) and (d) , and IBGE (1990 ) and ANESTBR, various issues
Yel, critics draw attention to the costly
Macroeconomic ‘side-effects’, whose most obvious
manifestations were a huge-external debt, whose service
was taking up 62% of export revenue even before the
interest and second oil shocks , and a record inflation
(38% in 1978) fuelled by indexation and by the
deterioration of public sector finances. The latter,
Provoked by the combined effect of the mounting indexed
domestic debt, credit subsidies, fiscal incentives and the
ee
87
(1999) See, €.g., IPEA (1979), Castro and de Souza (1985), and Batista
 
Textos para DiscussGo
SEs’ external debt.88 In addition, IS contribution to BPadjustmentis viewed with scepticism, particularly when
measured by import coefficients, since these indicators
would also reflect the slowdown in growth andinvestment during the 1980s.89
Even though the task of disentangling macroeconomic
from industria] Strategy failures is fraught with
difficulties, it seems that the problem with the neo-IS
Strategy went well beyond unsound macroeconomic
policies. In fact, a case can be made out that these
macroeconomic imbalances were just part of a series of
adverse results, overlooked by the enthusiasts, which
were rooted in the government's failure to go beyond a
mere patch up of the old IS strategy.
To begin with, despite the government's attempts to
increase the selectivity of the incentive regime by better
targeting BNDE credits and CDI incentives, the clamp
down on imports and the lack of control over theallocation of foreign loans, ensured that resources
remained dispersed across virtually all manufacturingactivities, regardless of the existence of static or dynamicComparative advantages. This was made particularly worseby the increased obsession with localisation indices,which kept mocking kept mocking Adam Smith's insightthat the division of labour is limited by the extent of
 
88 According to one estimate (Conjuntura 6Econémica, February 19the global federal deficit as a peresntage of GDP was 8.1% in. ig7o.Subsidies as a percentage of tax revenue increased from 13 to 41% ove .1974-79 (C. G. Langoni, “Bases Institucionais da Economia BrasilBACENas quoted in Dinsmoor(1990:129). ira
° See , e.g., Balassa 1979), F .
(1985). ( ), Fishlow (1986), and Tav
90 This insight was later developed by Stigler (1955)
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the market. As a result, exports became an even more
subsidised and costlier business (table A.24).9! Despite
responding to greater subsidies, they remained at 9% of
the manufacturing output, and under 7% of GDP (tables
A.8 and A.2). Apart from efficiency implications, this
result—given the low level of imports—left the bulk of the
BP adjustment to foreign loans, which in turn led to the
debt build-up.
On the issue of targeting the basic input and capital
goods industries, whereas the potential static and
strategic benefits were unquestionable (as the export
success of some of these industries was to prove), a
number of considerations regarding the choice and
implementation of the targets seemed to have been
overlooked. Looking first at the target chosen, there were
still clear gains to be made from better resource
allocation by increasing investments in the light industry.
Brazil’s under-employment in mid-1970s was unabated
and unit labour costs werestill falling (table A.13).92 This
Opportunity, though, was largely missed since, amid an
incentive bias against exports, BNDE credits and fiscal
incentives were concentrated in the heavy industry. As
€xpected, the light industry’s export performance was
ee,
21 To make things worse, a increasingly disproportionate amountof
Subsidies were directed to the TNCs, with no obvious dynamic benefits.
In 1978, Braga (1981) estimated that TNCs accounted for 42% of the
fiscal subsidies whereastheir share of total exports was 37%. The results
in terms of greater outward-orientation were not impressive. According
x One estimate (Baumann 1985) affiliates increased marginally their
Port ratio from 15.4% in 1971 to 18.6% in 1978. Blomstrém (1987)
belated in 8.7% the export ratio of the American affiliates in 1977, well“tow the LDCs’ average.
As of 1980, under-employmentwasstill at 35% of the economicallyactive Population (Wells 1987:96).
a IN]
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disappointing93, and labour absorption in themanufacturing sector slumped (table A.18).
Moreover, the technological and strategic externalitiesinvolved in the production of capital goods, should havebeen set against: a) the benefits of intra-industry tradeand access to State-of-the-art embodied technology, andb) the disadvantages of spreading scarce resources too
thinly. Yet, although the ratio of capital goods to GDI in1975 was lower than that of the US (Frischtak andDahlman 1990), the government went on to substitute asmuch ascapital goods imports as possible.
As for the implementation, despite the measuresaken to promote LPFs and sustainable market structures,the results were mixed, and on the whole unsatisfactory.In the basic input sector, strict investment licensing, FDI
restrictions, and greater outward-orientation, seemed tohave guaranteed plants close to the MES and an efficientnumber of producers, but SE remained as the dominant
Player. In the capital goods sector, the fact that the TNCswere already firmly installed, combined, as noted earlier,with an inconsistent industrial policy, led, more oftenthan not, to the entry of LPFs in already crowded andinward-oriented industrial structures. Apart fromaggravating the latter's inefficiency, this processPrecludes LPFs from benefiting from economies of scaleand specialisation, doing no wonders for their learning
 
93 In fact, Brazil's share of world exports of textiles and basicindustry increased significantly during the period (table A.30). Yet, jtremained unimpressive vis-a-vis other NICs. For instance, Korea's share
textile and clothing industries in Brazil contra:the Asian NICs... this confirm the conclusioninward oriented.”
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process or for the prospects of a limited period of
protection. %4
f this environment of inconsistent industrial
policy,inward-orientation. and fragmented and often FDI
dominated industrial structures, the objectives of
fostering LPFs’ technology capabilities and large private
conglomerates turned out to be elusive. In the former Ss
case, whereas the S&T infrastructure was significantly
improved, its links with manufacturing remained weak.
The evidence available suggests that the majority of the
firms did not go beyond the routine and
adaptive/duplicative technological tasks, to use Lall’s
(1992) taxonomy. During 1974-79 only 0.7% of the
industrial firms conducted formal R&D, the great
majority (63%) SEs; whereas the private sector’s outlays
on technology (R&D and royalties in 1978 and 1982)
were under 0.2% of net sales.2° No wonder why the bulk
of the internationally successful technology developments




94 The custom-built segment, where the entry of LPFs wasmore
Successful, is a case in point. BNDE (1988a) speaks of inward-orientedand excessively diversified LPFs, struggling with the large number of
Producers and the limited and cyclical internal market. It also points out
that vertical-integration was unduly pursued. The table A.29, showsthat
despite Brazil's limited internal market, the number of custom-built
&00ds producers tendsto be higher than in developed countries.
Data on R&D reviewed by Frischtak and DahIman (1990). Data onformal R&D involved the universe of legally established firms. Data on&D ownershipis for 1983, for a sample of 1,118 firms. As to technology
Oullays, the source was Braga and Matesco (1986), who using income taxdata for approximately 5000 large firms, find out that LPFs, 81% of theSample, accounted in average for 92% of the R&D outlays in 1978/80/82,Whereas TNCs, 19% of the sample, accounted for only 8%. With respecttooyalties, the TNCs accounted for 45% of the payments.
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As for the formation of large,avalabe private conglomerates, the limited evidence1980, ty,~BBest modest advances. For instance, as ofgroups we Fs’ share of the top 100 non-financia]31 amd as- was only 30.7%, with TNCs and SEs takingfirm level 6 papectively (Willmore 1987:169). At thefine teasSom 980, LPFs hadstill only 6% of the top 25iop 500 °S) % of the top 100, and their share of theell from 39 to 35% over 1974-80 (Exame,various issues). A com ari. sonby NICs’ standards p with Korea shows that even
internationally
Apart from the factors indicated above, the small sachieved by Brazil's private groups seems to have alsoaine on the precariousness of the governmentindeton in the financial sector. Tables A.19 and A.26LPRen that, despite the increase in BNDE credits, thedune, financing pattern did not change Significantlymaine the period. Retained earnings continued to be theDut thence, ofJongterm financing, a characteristic thath de by side with American firms, even though
Ittos inesalentanen.aratgovernment intervention led
S neither credit- normm -aND pased, to use Zysman’s (1983) categorising.ans: S peak, did not controlled more than 8% of
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the private sector loans (table A.11), and private
commercial and investment banks remainedlargely out of
the manufacturing sector (even though legal restrictions
were removed), LPFs have never had the amountof credit
available to their Koreans, Japanese and German
counterparts.97 On the other hand, high inflation-cum-
indexation, continued to preclude the developmentof a
capital market, and encourage inflationary financing.
In sum,for all its success in deepening the industrial
structure, diversifying exports, strengthening the LPFs
position and improving the S&T infrastructure, the II
NDP did not go far enough to change substantially the
pattern of Brazil's industrialization. The incentive regime
continued to be largely non-selective, biased towards the
internal market, and exports a heavily subsidised and
lesser business. Under total protection, largely market-
led credit allocation, lax investment and FDI licensing,
fragmented and inefficient industrial structures continue
to survive and proliferated as IS moved upstream. On the
financial side, the key issue of long term financing for
LPFs was only precariously solved. In this sort of
€nvironment, the LPFs’ growth was bound to be
hampered and macroeconomic imbalances, inevitable,
regardless of any ‘macroeconomicfailure’.
_—
worn, LPFs’ access to foreign loans were mainly for medium-term
term lee capital (resolution 63) (table A.27) which unlike the direct, long
left aside had high positive interest rates. For instance, even if 1979 is
1974.7S the average annual real interest rate for these loans during




VI-The Dismal Decade. The 1980s
When the interest and second oil shocks struck at theturn of the decade, Brazil could not be in a morevulnerable Position. As noted earlier, a huge external debihad been accumulated, inflation was high and reinforcedby widespread indexation, and oil made up more than onethird of imports (table A.4). In such a scenario, the three-fold increase in oil prices and the two-fold increase ininternational interest rates over 1978-82, could only playhavoc. In fact, the current account deficit reached 5.8%of GDP in 1982, and debt-service ratio 98%. Inflation, inturn, broke the three digit barrier in 1980. UnlikePrevious BP crises, this time there was no substantialimports to substitute, and the option of ‘borrowingits wayout the crisis’ received its coup de grace with Mexico’sdefault in 1982. With little room to manoeuvre andTesorting io misguided stabilization policies, theg0vernment would pass the rest of the decade strugglingwith these macroeconomic imbalances, creating an€nvironment of low, unstable growth and nearhyperinflation, hardly appropriate to
_
industrialdevelopment.
» the government would also forsake anyattempt to formulate a long-term industrial Strategy. Inpractice, this meant that the previous pattern ofintervention lingered on, and given the depth of the Bpcrisis and the sharp deterioration of thefinances, its shortcomings were furtherextra cuts in imports, S&T expenditureslong term financing.
This troubled decade can be rouperiods, marked by different Dp ghly divided inOlicy responses to {wothe
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mic difficulties. That is, the 1980-84
periods whenanorthodox BP-adjustment policy was
dopted, and the 1985-89 period, when the threat o
h erinflation led to a series of heterodox stabilisation
plans. Let us look at their implications for industry.
Under orthodox adjustment
o the country’s tradition, the government’s
firetreepense to the crisis was to pursue a stacey
designed to adjust and stabilize the economy wit ou
hurting growth. At its core was an attemptto shift rela ive
prices in favour of public sector and tradable goods. This
was done by adjusting public sector prices and devaluing
the currency in 30% (December 1979), while imposing
Strict price controls (including interest rates), and a pre-
fixed monetary and exchange rate correction for 1980
well below the expected rate of inflation. In this process,
fiscal subsidies to exports, advanced deposits on imports
and CDItariff exemptions were eliminated. By the end o
1980, though, expansionary policies had allowed me
relative price changes to be reversed by a two-fo
increase in inflation, while the BP situation continued to
deteriorate.98
The government, then, finally caved in, adopting an
Orthodox program in 1981. At first, given the 1979
experience, a real exchange devaluation was avoided
(crawling-peg was reintroduced) and efforts wereConcentrated on restricting demand and escalating
€xport subsidies and import controls. On the demand
Side, fiscal policy was tightened, wages partially de-
ee
°8 The PPP exchange rate for exports in 1980 wasbelow that of 1979(table A.17), see Belluzzo and Coutinho (1983) for details of theMacroeconomic policies during the period.
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indexed, quantitative credit controls im osed andsahacst rate ceilings removed. On trade policy, fiscal. . ded Eo exports were reinstated and export credits,nels . Moreover, new NTBs were introducedfor tins ng import Surcharges, mandatory import programsinn Jorimporters, and an expandedlist of prohibitedports. The interruption of voluntary capital inflows
F supervision,101
These measures eventually adjusted the BP, with thethough account showing a small Surplus in 1984, Evenca &N, as noted earlier, II NDP investments seem to4102. considerable weight in explaining these results, theacct growth in exports and the 39% fall in importsthe ally ated over 1980-84, cannot be dissociated fromcon,a sume high reached by export subsidies and importcon ols, and from the brutal recession that hit thewit The GDP fell by 0.7% per year over the period,outputfalling sharply in 1981 (-4.2%) and 1983 (-
eee
99subsidyWee the Tokyo Round, Brazil had agreed to phase out the fiscaleliminated xPorts until 1983. Yet, as mentioned, it was abruptlyproduct n December 1979. Whenreinstated in 1981, it lost itsIntros Specific character and a flat 15% rate of the export value wasBracil ced. This rate was to be phased out until 1983. In 1982, however,co t negotiated with the US, which was threatening to imposelosesrvalling duties, the extension of the subsidy until 1985 (CEpay
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3.6%). The aggregate investmentratio fell continuously
from 21 to 16%.
Industry was severely hurt in this process. The slump
in domestic demand combined with restrictions on BNDE
loans!92 and real interest rates for working capital
averaging 25% per year, led output to fall on average by
3% yearly over the period, whereas manufacturing
investment fell 36% in 1981, and was around the 1976
level in 1984. Among the manufacturing sectors, capital
goods, a key II NDP target, was worst hit. Output in 1984
was 22% below the 1975 level, and its share of
manufacturing structure fell below the 1970 mark (table
A.5).
The depth and length of the recession helped to put
into perspective the much-heralded good manufactured
export performance over period. True enough, Brazil
managed to increase its share of world exports in most
sectors (table A.30). Yet, despite the highest ever
Subsidies (table A.24) and the collapse of domestic
demand, the shift to exports was less than impressive,
with its contribution to recovery coming only in 1984.
Even then, exports made up less than 10% of the
manufacturing output(table A.7). The external constraint
argument does not seem to hold against the fact that
countries like Korea, increased manufactured exports at
an annual rate of 12% against Brazil’s 4% (1980-84).
More to the point, in the crucial machine and transport
€quipmentsector, its share of world exports fell to 0.6%,
whereas Korea's nearly trebled to 1.9 % (UN ITSY, HIT).
es
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All those years of ‘protected’ FDI, non-selective andinward-oriented incentive regime seem to have producedan industry that was not very happy or prepared to takeon the international market. An increase in the alreadycomprehensive NTBs could only aggravate this situation.Estimates of effective protection rates, for what they areworth!03 | put the average protection for manufacturing atthe end of the period as high as 43%, with an inter-industry structure thal bore no logic (table A.25). Apartfrom competitiveness considerations, the prospect ofhaving another period of unchallenged inward-orientedgrowth after the recession, might have certainly
precluded a stronger commitmentto exports.
Needless to say that this scenario of falling output andinvestments, coupled with a limited shift towards the
external market, did not help much the long term
competitiveness of the industry. The static and dynamic
diseconomies of scale associated with a prolonged
recession added to the old problems of fragmented
industrial structures and sub-optimal plants, causing
Productivity to plunge (table A.21). Moreover,investments in R&D fell from its modest levels (table4.31), with the public sector cutting back drastically itsinvestments in the modest S&T infrastructure. 104Technology imports also fell by 35% -84(BACEN). o fell by 35% over 1979
ee
shortcomings, the estimates for Brazil are further compromised by theCoens (prige controls, high inflation, out-of-date technica]coefficients to 10 years) and by the use of 7international prices. y ” emrexport Prices as104 ‘The FNDCTfell 74% inreal termsover 1975-84 (Bech1992:93). See Castro (1989) on the effects . “ker and Eglerestablishment.
of the cuts on the 1 fi
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To complete the picture, the orthodox adjustment
failed to stabilize the economy and ended up aggravating
the problem. Inflation more than doubled to 213% in
1984, reflecting again the widespread indexation and the
increasing deterioration of the public sector finances.
Despite the draconian cuts in government expending,
which reduced the operational fiscal deficit from 6.8 to
3.1% of GDP over 1982-84, the PSBR rose from 16.6 to
27.5%, due to the impact of higher inflation on the
indexed internal debt.!9 Apart from turning cost
accounting into a nightmare, this rampant inflation,
coupled with short-term indexed assets offering
stratospheric interest rates, made the prospect of
developing a proper source of long-term financing even
gloomier. Not surprisingly, LPFs moved even further into
internal financing (table A.26).
Paradoxically, it was amid this inhospitable
environment that the government, or at least part of it,
took the most important industry related initiative of the
1980s. Thatis, the decision to consolidate the so-called
‘market-reserve’ for mini- and micro computers, set upin 1977, and to expand it to much of the professional
electronics industry.!06 Among the several policy regimes
105 BACEN. PSBRstands for public sector borrowing requirements.
Unlike the operationaldeficit, it includes the monetary correction on the
internal debt.
106 ‘rhe market reserve beganofficially when CAPRE (Coordination of
Electronic Processing Activities), ultimately responsible for issuing
import licenses for electronic processing equipment and components,
Put to tender, in mid-1977, the production of minicomputers andselected
Only LPFs, In 1979, CAPRE was replaced by SEI (Special Secretariat forInformatics) which gradually expandedits control over the professionalelectronics industry except for mainframe computers and. “communication equipment. This process was crowned in 1984, by theIntroduction of the ‘informatics law’. See, e.g. , Piragibe (1985) for details.
Textos para Discussdo
originated in the late 1970s, this initiative stands out foriis almost unique attempt to apply correctly the infantindustry principle. That is, to protect LPFs (instead ofaffiliates) in an industry where the importance ofStrategic benefits and positive externalities are widelyrecognised, 107
Unfortunately, the basic IS, inward-oriented notionremained dominant. The government did not act as if itwas keen on promoting an internationally competitiveindustry. For instance, despite market imperfections suchas R&D and production related economies of scale, therewere about 37 different firms producing PC-clones in1985 (Schimtz and Hewitt 1992). Despite the limitedhumancapital base!08, and the benefits of intra-industrySpecialisation, vertical and horizontal diversification wasunduly encouraged. Finally, despite the capital marketfailures, BNDE loans came only late in the day, a problemSomewhat mitigated by the unprecedented decision ofSome Commercial banks (heavy user of computer systems)to entry the industry.
The results achieved so far seems to reflect theseshortcomings. On the one
_
hand, despite themacroeconomic chaos, the local computer industry grewat about 23% annually during the 1980s (Evans and Tigre1989), and ‘the skilled technical and engineering
 
107 See, e.g. Krugman (1984).
108 apart from the deficiencies of the educational system, there was alimited manufacturing tradition on electronics to build on sinproduction of mainframes and consumer electronics had been l vedominated by TNCs or pseudo-joint ventures. As Erber (1985. onpointed out, LPFs could not rely on human capital externalitj °:301)by the TNCssince the majority of the university trained on cteatedused in administrative and marketing activities SorenOnnel w.- Hewiit(1992) 9 as-to- Vvup-to-date information on the continuing problem of Skill shortage. more
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component of the labour force has grown substantially’
(Hewitt 1992:196). But on the other, after more than a
decade of protection, exports remained negligible and
prices are said to be twice that of US, despite the obvious
differences in quality.!°9
Under heterodox stabilization
If the implications of the orthodox adjustment for
industry were disastrous, and the flaws of government
intervention aggravated (except perhaps for the isolated
case of the computer industry), things were not much
better under the heterodoxy. The BP adjustment gave the
newly installed civilian government (March 1985) more
room to manoeuvre, and after a short-lived austerity,
fiscal and monetary policies became clearly expansionary.
AS a result, the recovery initiated in 1984 continued in
1985 with GDP growing 7.9%. Yet, the combination of fast
growth, a higherfiscal deficit and a food supply shock in a
very closed and indexed economy, put the monthly
inflation by year-end at 15%, or at an annualised rate of
435%.
With hyperinflation knockingatits door, and believing
that indexation was to blame, the government launched
the Cruzado Plan in February 1986—a heterodox attempt
to stabilize the economy that hadat its core a price-wage
freeze and the abolition of monetary correction.!10
Despite its success in reducing inflation to a monthly
average of 0.5% in the first six months, expansionary
fiscal, monetary and wage policies led to a consumer
 
 
t 109 Schimtz and Hewitt (1992:28ff}. According to these authors, theYeunological lag of the industry at the end of the decade was ‘below two
110 :For details see, e.g., Modiano (1990) and Dinsmoor(1990).
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boom that, in turn, raised inflation to above pre-planlevels in early 1987. To add to the gloom, the frozenexchange rate coupled with the domestic boom,produced a 2% of GDP current account deficit, which,given the low level of reserves, led the government to aninterest moratorium in February 1987.
After the failure of the Cruzado Plan, another two
were implemented (mid 1987 andearly 1989) Pursuing variants of the price-freeze-cum-de-
but combined with more restrictivefiscal and monetary policies. Even though they managedto slow down the economy—GDP growth fell from 7.6% in1986 to an annual average of 2% over 1987-89—andadjust the BP, they both went down the Cruzado path.Initial successes were followed by unprecedented rates ofinflation and re-indexation. By December 1989, inflationhad reached a mind-boggling monthly rate of 49%.nderlying these failures was an wicreasingly intractablefiscal deficit approaching 7% of GDP in 1989.11!
Reflecting this highly unstable macroeconomicenvironment, the performance of the manufacturingSector was erratic and on the whole poor. After growingOn average 11.3% in 1985 and 1986, output fell annuallyby 0.3% until 1989. Manufacturing investment in 1986was still well below 1980 levels, and fell even further in1987, following the decline of the aggregate investmentratio.!!2 The latter, after recovering to 18.7% in 1986,
 
ill Operational concept. The PSBR in 1988 was estimatedinGDP (BACEN). On these two plans see Dinsmoor, op.cit.
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i ini ly to 16.7% in 1989. Labour productivity,
functagnated around the dismal 1980-84 levels (table
A 21) and the whole decade produced the worst ICOR of
the post war period (table A.10).
ect, manufactured exports were also
afiested.Apartfrom the disruption of relative prices, low
investment and low productivity, competitiveness also
suffered from a higher incentive bias against exports. The
steep appreciation of the PPP-exchange rate prompted by
the price freezes (table A.17), coincided witha. gradual
and substantial reduction of export subsidies » which
was not properly balanced by a meaningful import
liberalisation.!!15 These events reinforced the export
market position as a poor and occasional alternative to
domestic crises, discouraging long-term commitments.
This is clearly indicated by an export performance that
mirrored the ‘boom and bust’ developments of the
internal market, with exporis growing on average 18.7%
in the years of negative or no growth (1987-88), and
 
113 Asurvey of the views of the most importantindustrial producersin October 1987, revealed that only 53% ofthose interviewed consideredits sector to be technologically update (Sondagem Conjuntural,FGV/PEC/CEI). Another survey in 1990 by the National Confederation ofIndustry revealed similar findings. See Frischtak and DahIman (1990).114 Table A.24. It began in early 1984, triggered by the deteriorationof public finances and pressures from trade partners. First, monetarycorrection (MC) was introduced on export loans. Then, the CentralBank's open-ended discounts to export credits were abolished and
were finally dropped, and in 1989 thecorporate tax exemption raised from 0 to 3%, (Guimaraes 1989 anda).
1 1SThe most ‘daring’ allempt to lib .1988. See below. & Pp eralise imports came only in mid
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stagnating or declining when growth resumed (-0.2 over1985-86 and -16% in 1989).
Not surprisingly, Brazil’s share of world manufacturedexports over 1984-87 fell or stagnated in most segments,including the light industry despite falling unit labourcosts.!16 This decline could have been worse had it notbeen for the long-term export agreements under theBEFIEX scheme, which forced firms to export whateverthe costs, and that continued to receive, until 1989, thefiscal subsidy eliminated for the regular exports in 1985.The BEFIEX's share of manufactured exports rose from17 to 40% over 1979-86 and reached 50% in 1989. 117
Amid the disruption and Stagnation provoked by thefailure of successive stabilization plans, there were twoattempts to reform the policy regime that are worthnoting. The first came in the beginning of the period,when worries about the industry's competitiveness led toa new emphasis on developing the local S&Tinfrastructure. 118 The Ministry for Science andTechnology (MCT) was then created in 1985, giving the
116 The ratio of Brazil's unit labour cost to the East Asia NICs'average (Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Singapore), measured in dollarsper hour,fell from 1.4 in 1975 to 0.6 in 1986 (US Bureau of LabourStatistics as quoted in Araujo Jr. et al. 1990:17). With regard to the rest ofthe world (weighted average) Brazil's unit labour costs fell 25% Over1976-87, although it has presented heavy fluctuations over this Period
(BNDE 1992b).
? Baumann(1990). Theelimination of the CDItariff exemptionsforcapital goods in 1979, also boosted BEFIEX exports since this benefjcouldbe obtained under the scheme. ent
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Subject an unprecedented ministerial status, with
investments increasing sharply in 1986.1!9 Yet, this
revival was short lived, and expending cuts initiated in
1987 brought investments back to the depressed 1984
levels, with the MCT being abolished in 1989. The cuts in
S&T expenditures coupled with falling LPFs’ investments,
not only worked against increases in the latter’s
technological capabilities but also widened the gap
between the productive sector and the S&T
infrastructure. To add to the problem, human capital
indicators showedlittle progress during the 1980s (tableA.15), with Brazil still ranking poorly among NICs.!20
The second attempt came only in 1988, with the so-called ‘New Industrial Policy.” Seeking to increaseProductivity, technological Capabilities and reducegovernment intervention, this initiative comprised: a) alimited importliberalisation involving a partial removal ofNTBs!2! and a tariff reform that reduced the averagemanufacturing tariff from 90 to 43% (table A.25); b) theTe-introduction of fiscal incentives to capital good
tered by a revampedDI; and c) legislation allowing the establishment of€xport processing zones (EPZ).!122 These measures,
 
119 The FNDCT,for instance, almost doubled over 1984-86 (Beckerand Eagler 1992).
enrolmentrati zi1988 was 11% against 37% in Korea, 41% in Argentina (UNESeeAnFrischtak and Dahlman (1990) for an assessment of th . Seeconditions of Brazil educational system. © presentImport Surcharges were removed, the list of Prohibited imports
Shortened from 2400 to 120requirements for some imports ited(mare the minimum financingFor details see Matesco (1988) and IMFa
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though,hadlittle impact. First, legal tariff remained highand the system of import licensing remained in place,including NTBs such as the‘law of similar’. And second,the dire financial conditions of the public sectorleft littleroom for fiscal benefits, a fact that largely prevented theirimplementation, including the anachronistic EPZs.Serious changes in the incentive regime would have towait until the next decade.
In sum, the impact of external shocks magnified byprevious misguided intervention in the product (tradebias) and financial markets (indexation), largely reducedthe government's action over the 1980s to a series ofunsuccessful adjustment and stabilization attempts. Facinga highly unstable environment, industry fell into a viciouscircle of falling output, investments and productivity,
which coupled with a higher trade bias, produceddeclining market shares abroad. This decline incompelitiveness, however, cannot be dissociated from theindustry's structural weaknesses fostered by decades ofan ill-conceived approach to market failures. That is, itsfragmented and excessively integrated structure, its sub-optimal plants, its weak local private sector, the lack oflong-term financing, the limited and isolated S&Tinfrastructure, and the poor humancapital endowment.
Conclusion
The mixed results presented by Brazil's
industrialisation seem to closely reflect the dubiousquality of government intervention throughout the variousstages of its development. It seems clear that insteaq ofbeing moulded and disciplined by the internatjprices, and by the nature of the relevant market f, hehe
government action was largely guided by the pres ailures,
keep the economy growingatall costs, and by Sures toremove what was seen to be the most bindin, need toconstraints, i.e., the foreign exchange gap. This,” Of the
Coupled
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with a solid export pessimism—deeply rooted on the
backwardness caused by centuries of ‘export-oriented’
colonial history—set the stage for an industrialization
strategy that blindly followed the country’s import
composition.
Whereas there is no doubt that this strategy was
successful in turning an agrarian country into a highly
sophisticated industrialised economy, the combination of
wrong incentives and an inconsistent and often
misguided approach to marketfailures, led not only toa
damaging waste of resources, but also produced serious
structural weaknesses that seriously compromised the
industry's efficiency and competitiveness, while exposing
the economy to violent macroeconomic imbalances.
Decades of a non-selective, inward-oriented incentive
regime coupled with ‘protected’ FDI, lax investmentlicensing and largely market-oriented credit allocation,
look industrial diversification and vertical integration
beyond what would be economically sound. It also
Produced unsustainable market structures, held together
only by high and permanent protection. Facing inward-Oriented incentives, Squeezed by the TNCs’ imperfect
competition, lacking a proper source of long termMancing, having a poor human capital base to build on,and handicapped by a limited S&T infrastructure, LPFsdid well to Survive and grow.Yet, this growth, as we haveSeen, was largely modest both in terms of size andechnological capability. The macroeconomic chaos of the980s only added to these problems.
eennicethe beginning of the 1990s, the government has. ie ing important steps towards a serious overhaul of‘vas etignne regime. A program of import liberalisationNTBs ee which included the removal of the relevantreductions a four year advanced schedule for tariff» €nvisaging an average nominal tariff of 20% in
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1994, with a maximum of 40% for infant industries, 123
However macroeconomic stability continues to beelusive,
with yet another heterodox stabilization plan failing to
control inflation, Moreover, the reforms have been taking







Table A.l: Share of fos Hes Chemis men andeee ge de Brazil's
eral, anti-government rhetoric that Weseacteed e S
threaten to throw away the baby with the bath-water. We[ar EE ser gos 908 020507 any aoe
Sha 98 19.2 24.0 35.2 48.0 $1.0 60.0 60.0 59.0
owtpet’ Tight 90.2 80.8 76.0 64.9 52.0 49.0 400 40.0 41.0The source of most of Brazil's problems, as suggested, TIC;HCletudeceil9,omtl einer09, bcoxiOTmdeis not governmentintervention per se but the quality of peehopuc(4mdottmars9),FHCdeswagwh
this intervention. Deficiencies such as a weak local private aaFrceeermeceiiat IBGEcat 1906 priceSector, lack of long-term financing, low domestic SorenGOYA tsCoeeraeandANESTER[Ib5mtadGE (1000)Seeeieal effort, poor human capital base and limited
nfr




   




   
able A.astructure, are not going to be solved by marketforces alone. They all arise from market failures in the
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Tt does not include rent, financial mstitutions and non-specified
services, Note: figures until 1947 are in constant prices, The rest of
the series is on current pnces. Numbers tn parenthesis are the GDP
share of the manufacturing sector. Source: Goldsmith (1986:11) for
1889 to 1947 and IBGE (1990) for the rest of the period.
Soarce: Data from Goldsmith (1986:11) for the
u and u UN      Open and outward-oriented economy.
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Table A.7: Brotil's Export and Import Ratlos by Manulactarlag Sector.
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Table A.10: Brazil’s ICOR.
 
Formation 1947-87! ; ; 1948-891
State firms?  B0V. budget public sector private sector total 1948-55 565
1947-55 2.9 23.2 26.1 73.9 100 1956-64 2.34
1956-64 93 23.8 33.1 66.9 100 1965-73 1.94
1965-73 18.7 23.7 42.4 57.6 100 1974-79 4.70
1974-79 224 14.7 36.9 63.1 100 1980-89 9.50
65.4 100
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from Bergaman (1970-92); and Serra (1982) for 1970-1980. For the rest of the period, the structure
was estimated IBGE foe
 
T Arithmetic average. 7
in steel, mining, petr
Source: State firms data from Wemeck (1969:99) for 1947-65, Tr
ebat
(1983:122) for 1966-79, and Dinsmoor (1990:126). Rest of data from IBGE.
(1990).
Over 1966-79, includesonly the federal large state firms
ochemicals, telecommunications, electricity and railroads.
implicit deflator and the gross fixed
capital formation by the WPI.
Source: Data from IBGE(1990) and
Conjuntura Econdmica July 1991.   
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Table A.11: National Development Bank (BNDES) loans by Sector (1953-89)!
sectors (% of total loans) Goloms to] loans/ mof. loans/mnt.
private GrcrS investment(%)
HCl2 tight} manuf. public private sector % HCI light manuf
1953-55] 88.6 11.4 10.3 [891* 10.9*[ na. 2.2 na. a. na.
1956-64] 97.4 2.6 $6.0 86.5 13.5 dl 3.3 na ona, 8.8
1965-73 67.9 32.1 72.9 39.9 60.5 4.8 55 na. na. 19.3
1974-79 74.2 25.8 66.2 yg.o# gia 8.1 13.0 51.4 31.5 43.1 (28)
1980-82] 72.2 27.8 49.9 an. naa. 1.2 10.2 SO.4t 36.7! 43.9 (23)!
1983-89) 60.9 39.1 52.9 na ma. 3. 9.1 na na. na.     
 Tarithmetic average of approved loans, except for the figures in parentheses which are disbursed loans. 1981prices 2 Metallurgy, chemicals, non-metallic, machinery, transport equip.> Textile, footwear and others.“BNDB’s share oftotal loans to the private sector , SGross fixed capital formation, °1952-5, # 74-71,11980-81 . Source: Zoninsein (1984) for 1953-81 loans and BNDES (1992). Investment data from Serra   1983:102) and IBGE (1990).
 
   
 
Table A.12: Trends of Net Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in Brazil: 1948-88. !
US$ million? —% mnf. inv.3——_*% met capital
inflow4
1948 16.5 na, 45.9
1952 8.6 nea. 14.0
1956 84.4 29.6 30.9
1960 104.4 21.7 20.0
1964 47.4 5.9 12.7
1968 99.4 10.3 12.3
1972 486.5 14.5 10.9
1976 1036.3 14.9 12.5
1980 1461.0 22.6 11.3
1984 366.4 na. 41
1988 95.8 naa. 5.9
"Three-year moving average, “Total FDI plus reinvestments
minus withdrawals, debt-swaps and Brazilian investment
abroad. 31970 prices. 4 Net FDI plus medium and long termloans. Source: For FDI, BACEN,various issues. For 1955-69 mnf. investment, Serra (1982: 102), For the rest of the






Table _A.13: Brazil's Real Unit Labour Costs!.1949-84.
1949 1959 196219631964 1967 1968 1969 1970 1972 1973
Total? 100-93 +99 +291 90 90 85 82 82 86° «77
Direct} 100° 81 79 80 78 na. ma na 74 70 66
1974 19751976 19771978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Total 76 68 71 74 76 74 62 66 69 61 53
Direct 62 62 65 68 69 69 64 66 64 58 51
" Changes in the real manufacturing average wage (deflated by the WPI, 1986=100) adjusted by
the changesin labour productivity (Value-added per employee). 2 All employees 3 Production Workers. Source: ANESTBR, various issues and IBGE 1990.  
Table_A.14: Brazil's Legal Tariff Rate. 1966-77 (%)
1966 1967 1971 1975 1977
 
 
     
Manufacturing 99 48 67* [na. |70.0
Capital goods for mnf. 49 36 43.6 41.0 60.6,
Capital goods for agric. 32 25 44
|
38.7 41.3
Interm. goods for mnf. 42 30.5 45.6 311 75.9
Interm. goods for agric 26.4 12.8 20.0
Transport equipment 55 42 36.5 47.7 65.2
Consumer durables 80 64 [100.7 115.2 140.2
Consumer non-durables 73 54 102.7 105.7 154.4
Note: Data for manufacturing is the sectoral) average weighted by the
1970 output, For the rest of the data, simple averages.* 1973, Source:
Doellinger et al.(1974:134) for 1966-67, Rosa et al. (1979:12) for 1971-
77 and Baumann (1985:230)for the manufacturing average.  





illiteracy primary secondary tertiary
rate! _[210* >20*
[
Enr.ratio! 210* 220* Enr. ratio! >10* >20* Enr. ratio!
1940 65.0 [12.1] 12.1 na. 3.3 [3.8 na, 0.3 na.1950] 57.0
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Table A.17 : Brazil's Effective Purchase-Power-Parily
Exchange Rates!: 1954-87 (1980 prices)
year exports? imports? official year  exports® official
1954 23.9 53.7 mrt 1972 58.7 46.7
1955 29.3 63.8 mr. 1973 57.8 46.6
1956 29.4 76.0 mr. 1974 62.0 51.8
1957 31.3 97.3 mr. 1975 61.0 48.9
1958 34.0 89.2 mr. 1976 62.6 48.7
1959 41.7 104.3 mr. 1977 64.5 48.5
1960 44.6 87.6 mr 1978 61.5 46.9
1961 49.5 117.9 m.r. 1979 64.1 49.7
1962 49.2 131.7 45.6 1980 56.5 S27
1963 42.1 120.3 39.6 1981 67.4 52.8
1964 Sh7 122.4 41.5 1982 74,3 56.2
1965 53.0 106.9 49.5 1983 83.8 70.4
1966 45.8 15.4 45.8 1984 77.8 68.4
1967 43.1 61.2 42.1 1985 79.0 72.3
1968 46.1 62.5 43.5 1986 na. 67.4
1969 53.4 70.8 48.2 1987 na. 62.9
1970 56.5 10.9 47.7 1988 na. 52.7
1971 $8.2 na, 41.6 1989 na. 32.6
T Relevant exchange rate times the ratio of the average WPIof Brazil's major
trade partners (UA, U.K., Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands.) to Brazil's
WPI ? Includes export bonuses and net subsidies. 3 Includes legal tariffs and
surcharges. Not available for the post-1970 period. 4 Multiple rates
Source: For 1955-68 nominal effective rates on exports and imports (until
1969) Bergsman (1970:38). Rest of the data owncalculation using Baumann
(1990: 180) estimates for export subsidies and data from BACEN and IMF).
Table_A.18: Brazil’s Manufacturing Employment Elasticities, 1939-84.)
 T Aged 10 andover. * Highest school
 
attainmentofthe literate population aged over 10 and 20,
Enrolmentas a percentage of the age group. **1965 Source: IBGE Indicadores Sociais as quoted in
World Bank 1979:121, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook_and_ANPSTBR, various issues.
(%) 1939-49 1949-59 1959-70 1970-75 1975-80 1970-80 1980-84
0.6 (4.7) 0.3(2.9) _0.6(4.0) 1.0 (11.7) 0.8 (5.2) 0.9 (7.3) 1.2 (-3.5) 
 
   
 
    
   
Table A.16: Direction of Manufactured Exports. 1965-79
light! heavy”
De TDC DC IDC
1965 81.7 18.3 12.5 87.5
1970 81.4 18.6 30.3 69.8
1975 63.5 36.5 3h 68.9
1979 89.8 10.2 37.2 62.8
Mincludes food, textile and footwear. “Includes transport equipment,curd other equipment, Source: Data from World Bank (1983:194
 
T Total employment growth divided by real output growth. Compound annual rates until
1970 and ordinary least square rates thereafter. Numbers in parenthesis are manufacturingemployment growth. Source: IBGE 1990  
Table A.19: Debt-equity ratios of Brazil, Korea,
Japan, USA_and Germany: 1964-83
ear Brazil Korea Japan US German,
1954 92.3 na. na, na, nea.
1964 112.7 100.5 na. nea. na.1973 92.6
=
272.7 449.0 92.0 185.01976 137.5 364.6 «488.0
©
86.0 212.01978 120.0 366.8 421.0 93.2, 222.71980 142.0 487.9 377.8 101.5 215.31982 115.0 385.8 298.6 «106.1 247.81983 114.0 360.3 277.0 103.5 241.7“For Brazil debt-equity ratios are for the non-financial seciorwhile for rest of the countries they are for the manufacturingsector. Ratios are liabilities divided by net-worth, Source: ForKorea, BOK,Financial Statement Analysis, various years. ForBrazil, Goldsmith (1986) for 1954-76 and Almeida (1988) for





 Table_A.20: Brazil's Effective Tariff Rates, 1958-67 (%)
 
      
methodbased on legal
adjusted for tariffs. b)
based on legal tariffpI 
Sectors 1958" 19638 19668 1967" 19660 1967
Total industry 30 75 44 14 83 36
Agriculture ~47 =15 -13) -14 n.a, na.
Manufacturing 106 184 108 48 118 66
Capital goods 53 113 69 52 100* 60*
Intermediate goods 65 131 68 39 110 67
Consumer durables 242 360 230 66 151 75.
Consumer non-durables 173 101* Machinery onl ly. Source:a) Fishlow (1975:58) "Foreign Trade Regimes and EconomicDevelopment: Brazil "
lus non-tariff barriers.
 
Mimeo. as quoted in Carvalho and Haddad (1981:42). Non- specified
tariff . Sectoral figures are averages weighted by the 1959 value-added
Bergsman and Malan (1971:122)1970 output as weights. Corden method  
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 Table A.24: Korea's and Brazil's Export Subsidies and
Export Related Imports as # percentage of Manufactured
Exports (FOB). 1969-85
 
Table A.21: Labour productivity
In_ Manufacturing!
Table A.22: International Comparison of the
 
 
   
 
Korea (%) Brazil
year subsidies! imports? subsidies? imports?
Net___Gross % ofexp.|| Net Gross % of exp.
1969 64 27.8 66.3 q27 2.34
1970] 6.7 28.3 56.2 $2.7 6.51
1971 6.6 29.6] 63.6 53.1 8.05
1972 3.2 268] 54.8 58.8 8.55
1973] 2.2 23.7] 53.1 58.3 11.69
1974] 21 21.2 55.2 10.50
1975 2.7 16.7 56.0 16.28
1976] 25 16.9 65.8 14.07
1977] 1.9 19.2 72.5 9.37
1978] 2.3 19.5 68.1 10.04
1979} 2.3 20.2 67.5 na.
1980] 3.3 213 45.1 na.
1981] 2.2 na, na. 118 na.
1982] 04 na. 25.9 16.7 na.
1983] 0.0 na na, 58.5 na.
1984] na na. na. 53.0 na.
1985 nama. na too 49.2 na   Number _of Producers of Selected Capital Goods. 19801949-64 4.5 Brazil Germany US: Japan1965-73 45 Water turbines 4 2 1 31974-79 341 Hydrogenerators 4 2 3 41980-84 . Rolling Mills 7 3 3 3
" 13 Blast furnaces 4 3 1 41985-88 0.0 Large mechanical presses __5 2 2 na.
1 Compound rate of growth ofvalueadded per production worker. 1986rices. Source: IBGE 1990.   Source: Lagoet al. “A Indiistria Brasileira de Bens de Capital”  Estudos Especiais 1. BRE/FGV as quotedin Vilella (1984).
Table A.23: Share of
Manufactured and Total Exports. Brazil 1967-86. (%)
Foreign Firms in Manufactured, Semi-
a) total) mnf. and semi-mnf.__c) equip. and instrum.d) other mnfs
 
1967 na. 338° Tea. nA.
1974 na. 30.0t 67 7
1978 23.1 44.9(38.8) 64 23
1980 28.4 50.2(38.3) 62 22
1984 26.7 39.4 67 18
1985 27.8 41.7 63 18
1986 28.4 42.2 nia. na.
major shareholder.
during the period .
(1987) estimates, 
*Fanjnzylber (1971:207). Sample includes 1147 firms, but restricted to
manvfactures, excluding semi-manufactured exports.t Baumann (1985:238).
Notes: 1) In (a) and (b) foreign firm is defined as having non-residents as the
BNDES (1988b:111). The results in (b) tendto overestimate theshare since it includesfirms from agriculture and misectors, however, made upfor only 3% in avera,
Cacex data. 3) The
7from a sample of 12435 firms, while the 1980 datimate oleae 88 drawnaccounting for more than 95% of involvedmanufacturing out ed 47769 firm
Data from a Cacexstudy whose results were published inrest foreign firms'
ait sectors. These two1 geof the total stock of F2) (c) and (4) is from Fritsch and Franco (1988) aitnumber in parentheses are Cepal's (1985) and Willmore's  
 
TKorea data for total exports. Yet manulactured exports averaged 94%.
during the period. Net subsidiesinclude direct cash subsidies, export
dollar premium, direct tax reduction and interest rate subsidy. Gross
subsidies includes net subsidy plus indirect tax exemptions andtariff
exemptions. ?Net subsides comprise direct tax reduction, tax credits
and interest rate subsidy. Gross subsidies include net subsidies plus
indirect tax andtariff exemptions. *Export-related imports consists of
parts and raw material used in export production which were exempted
from impon and indirect taxes. Source: Orginal data from Kim, S. K.
(1991 :33), Hong (1979:68) and KFTA (1989)for Korea; and from
Baumann (1990) and Musalem (1983:746) for Brazil.
 
 




Table A.26: Brazil, U.S, and Korea Source of Funds by
the Corporate Sector. 1978-84.
autofinance |extemal| total
ne       
  
        
external
Brazil loans shares othersa 1978 58.8 41.2
|
100 51.1] 35.9 13.0= os 1980 62.5 37.5 100} 69.6 24.1 63: : x 1982 65.7 34.3 100 f'58.8 29.0 12.158.6 14.5 [19.0 1984 16.8 23.2 100 s4.7| 248 20.633 5.91722 |
a 38.7 13-6
)
1977-81 23.3 76.7 100 53.7 24.8 21.5: 5.57105] 1982 27.0 73.0 100 }55.4] 31.8 12.846.6 50.1 18.9 1984 333 66.7 100 60.5 321 7.4eschon aries weichied by the 1975 output at US: for 1980 which is wei;steamer er srneditemametprce || 1979
|
787 ata soo Less asa —(1980) and 1975 (other years) technical 1984 83.5 Tes tee Wee] ek =1983:553) for 1980 , Braga et al. (1988) = 16. 100
J
124.8] 24.8 aume (1988) for 1988 and 1989 Note: Data for Brazil was based in a sample of the 90 largest locallyowned firms. Source: For Brazil, D.G. Rodrigues “ Empresas Nao-Financeiras no Brasil: Evologio de Desempenho no Periodo 1975-84." IBMEC, 1986, as quoted in Cysne et al. (1990:330). For Korea






 Table A.27: Share of Forelgn Loans by Type and Firm
Ownership (1966-81)!
1966 1968 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
Indirect short-term loans (res. 63) 32.8 27.6254 27.7 42.0
Direct long-term loans (law 4131) 67.2 72.4 74.6 172.3 58.1
total 100.100 100 100 100
all Toans Direct loans (law 4131 )
local firms} 6.5 13.1 209/214 7.9 5.0 5.1 4.7
foreign
|
44.2 76.3 60 45.3 46.5 40.8 23.7 22.3
Public sec 146.4 6.3 3.9 133.3 45.6 54.3 71.2. 73.1
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
three year moving average from 1973 onwards.Source: For 1966-71 Pereira , J.E. (1974) “Financiamento ExternoCrescimento Econémico no Brasil: 1966:73." Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES,Colegao Relatérios de Pesquisa n°27, as quoted in Villela and Baer (1980) ;and for 1972-81 Cruz (1984:100,140)
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Table A.30: Brazil’s Share of Exports by Economic Group
and Sector 1950-89.
SITC 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1984 1987 1989
World
=
2.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.4 ll 1
LDC mof. 0.9 1.5 2.6 3.8 3.9 na.
World mnt. 0.2 04 07 09 O8 na.
chemicals (5) 0.2 03 05 11 O08 na
iron & steel (67) 06 O04 12 3.2 24 ma
non-ferrous (68) 0.0 02 02 14 1.9 na
mach.ttransp.(7) 01 04 07 06 06 ma.
textile (26+65484) 0.2010 08 11 07 na
basic (648-68) 03° 06 O8 14 0.9 na.
 Table A.28: Share of Government, Foreign and Domestic Firms TnBrazilian Manufacturing: 1971-80 (% of sales)  Notes: a) manufacturing defined as 5 10 8 minus 68. b) figures forindustrial sectors are world shares. Source: UN (ITSY and HIT).   
 
      
1971 1980DF FF SE DF FF agManufacturing 43.6 45.1 11.3 59. 28.5 12.5LightIndustry 67.7 28.5 0.0 TTS. 19.3 0.8Heavy Industry 116 51.8 36.6 45.5 36.8 ATTMetallurgy 44.6 27.3 28.1 na. na. oeMachinery 35.8 64.2 0.0 59.0 41.0 30Elec. & Comm.eq..] 35.1 64.9 0.0 56.0 44-0 <5Transp. equipment 42.7 57.3 0.0 29.0 68.0 ooChemical 17.8 30.0 52.2 27.0 21.0 2.0Pharmaceutical 39.5 60.5 0.0 28.0 1.0 2
 
Notes: a) The figures for the three YeAesAteook auricycomparabledekodilfereiers
izes. 1971, it covered the largest firms act Mo
e hee tends to underestimate the share of the oar DFs. For 1980,
the firmsinvolved accounted for roughly 95% of manufacturing output. b) data for heavy
andlight industry (defined as in table A.5), own calculation using manufacturing value-
added as weights. ¢) DFstands for Domestic firm, MNCfor foreign firm and GFfor
government firm. Source: Tyler (1976:52) for 1971, and Willmore (1987: 165) for 1980,
in
 
   
  
   
  
    
  
 
      
  
 
       
Table A.29: International Comparison of theNumber of Producers of Selected Capital Goods. 1980Brazil Germany USWater wibines 4 2 i -
Hydrogenerators 4 2 3 4Rolling Mills 7 3 4 :




Table A.31: R&D Expenditures in Selected
Countries _as_a_ proportion of GNP




ABREU,M.P.(1990) Inflacdo, Estagnacao e Ruptura: 1961-64. in M.P.
ABREU(ed.) A Ordem do Progresso: cem anosdepolitica
econémica republicana. 1889-1989. Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Campus.
ALBERT,B. (1983) South America and the World Economy from
Independence to 1930. London: Macmillan.
ALMEIDA,J. S. (1988) Instabilidade da Economia e Estrutura
Financeira das Empresas no Brasil do Ajustamento
Recessivo. Rio de Janeiro: Discussion Paper n°178 Institute
of Industrial Economics. Federal University of Rio de
Janeiro. December.
ANUARIO ESTATISTICO DO BRASIL (ANESTBR). Various issues. Rio de
Janeiro: IBGE.
ARAUJOJr., J., HAGUENAUER, L. and MACHADO,J.B. (1990) Protecdo,
Competitividade e Desempenho Exportador da EconomiaBrasileira nos Anos 80. Pensamiento Iberoamericano n°17,
pp.13-37.
BALASSA,B (1989) Outward Orientation. in H. Chenery and T.N.
Srinivasan (eds.) Handbook of Development Econonnics,Vol. I. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science Publishers,
BANCO CENTRALDO BRASIL (BACEN), Boletim Mensal, various issues
BAER, W.(1969) The Developmentof Brazil Steel Indust oN .
Vanderbilt University Press. Ty. Nashville:
-____— (1988) Foreign Investment in Brazil: Their BenefitCosts. in R. FENDT and J. S. CARRILLO, (eds.) ae ondBrazilian Economyin the Eighties .
BALASSA,BELA (1979) Incentives Policies inDevelopment, Nov n Brazil. World/Dec. 7(1 1/12) pp. 1023-46,




BATISTA, J. C. (1992) Debt and AdjustmentPolicies in Brazil. San
Francisco: Westview Press.
MANN,R. (1985) Exportacées e Crescimento Industrial no Brasil.
nay me de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES. Série monogrdafica.
BAUMANN,R and BRAGA, H.C.(1985) O Sistema Brasileiro de
Financiamento as Exportagdes. Rio de Janeiro:
IPEA/INPES, Série de Estudos de Politica Industrial e
Comércio Exterior n°2, March.
BAUMANN,R (1990) Befiex: Efeitos Internos de umIncentivo a
Exportacdo. Revista Brasileira de Economia vol. 44. n°2
April/ June.
BAUMOL, W. P., PANZAR, J. C. and WILLIG, R. D. (1982) Contestable
Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
BECKER, B. K. and EGLER, C. A. (1992) Brazil: a new regional powerinthe world economy. A regional geography. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
BELLUZZO,L.G.M. and COUTINHO,L. (1983) Politica Econémica,Inflexées e Crise: 1974-81. in L.G. M. Beluzzo e Coutinho, R.(eds.) Desenvolvimento Capitalista no Brasil: ensaiossobre a crise. Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense.
BERGSMAN,J. (1970) Brazil: Industrialization and Trade Policies.London: Oxford University Press for the OECD.
BERGSMAN,J. and MALAN,P. (1971) The Structure of Protection inBrazil. in B. BALASSA Structure of Protection inDeveloping Countries. The John Hopkins University Pressfor the World Bank.
.
BHAGWan}, J. (1965) On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas. in R.E.Baldwinetal. (eds.) Trade, Growth and the Balance ofPayments: Essays in Honourof Gottfri eC . :
R nd Me Nai Yy. of Gottfried Haberler. Chicago:
BIATO, AF., GUIMARAES,k, and FIGUEIREDO,M.H. (1973) Transferénciade Tecnologia no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES.
Industralization and Interventions. Brazil.
BIELSCHOWSKY,R. (1978) Notas sobre a Questdo da Autonomia
Tecnoldgica na Industria Brasileira. in W. Suzigan (ed.)
Industria: Politicas, Instituigoes e Desenvolvimento. Série
Monografica n°28, IPEA/INPES, Rio de Janeiro.
BLOMSTROM,M.(1987) Transnational Corporations and Manufacturing
Exportsfrom Developing Countries. New York: United
Nalions Centre on Transnational Corporations.
BNDES (1988a) Questées Relativas a Competitividade da Indtistria
Brasileira de Bens de Capital: Bens de Capital de
Encomenda e Maquinas-Ferramenta. Rio de Janeiro.
Estudos BNDES. Junho
(1988b) O Capital Estrangeiro na Indtistria Brasileira:
Atualidade e Perspectivas. Rio de Janeiro: Estudos BNDES.
Maio.
(1992) BNDES 40 anos. Um Agente de Mudangas. Rio
deJaneiro. BNDES.
(1992b) Indicadores de Competitividade Internacional da
Industria Brasileira 1970/90. Estudos BNDES n°21.
BONELLI, R. and FACANHA, L. O. (1978) A Industria de Bens de Capital
no Brasil: Desenvolvimento, Problemas e Perspectivas, in
W. Suzigan (ed.) Indtistria: Politicas, Instituigdes e
Desenvolvimento. Rio de Janeiro: Série Monografica n°2g8
IPEA/INPES. ,
BONELLI, R and WERNECK(1978) Desempenho Industrial: auge edesaceleracao nos anos 70. in W. Suzigan (ed.) Industria:Politicas, Instituigdes e Desenvolvimento. Rio de Janeiro:Série Monografica n°28, IPEA/INPES, o
BRAGA,H.C. (1981) Aspectos Distributivos do Esquema di idiFiscais a Exportacao de Manufaturacos, « SubsidiosPPlanejamento Econémico 11(3), December. esquisa e
BRAGA,H.C. and MATESCO,v. (1986) Progresso TécnicBrasileira: Indicadores e Andlise de ° Na Indtistriq" seus Fato,Determinantes. Rio de Janeiro: resIPEA/INPES. “ro: Discussion p
Textos para Discussdo
BRANDER, J. (1986) Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial
® ics In P. Krugman (Ed) Strategic Trade Policy and
The New International Economics. Cambridge, Mass. MIT
Press.
‘ARNEIRO,D.D. (1987) Brazil—Stabilization and Adjustment: Policies
° e andyal Country Study n°11, Helsinki, WIDER, UNU,
1987a.
CARVALHO,J.S. AND HADDAD,C.L.S. (1981) Foreign Trade Strategies
and Employment in Brazil. in A. O. Krueger et al. , Trade
and Employmentin Developing Countries Vol. 1. Individual
studies. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
CASTRO, A.B. and de SOUZA,F.E.P. (1985) A Economia Brasileira em
MarchaForcada. Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Paz e Terra.
CASTRO,C.de M.(1989) What is happeningin Brazilian Education. in E.
BachaandH.Klein (eds.) Social changein Brazil, 1945-85:
the incomplete transition. New Mexico: University of New
Mexico Press. First published in Portuguese in 1986.
CENARIOS.Sao Paulo. Various Issues.
CEPAL (1985) Market Structure, Firm Size and Brazilian Exports.Estudios e Informesde la Cepal n° 44. United Nations.
CEPAL(1985a) Trade Relations Between Brazil and the United States.Estudios e Informesde la CEPALn° 52. United Nations.
COES,D.V. (1991) Brazil. in P.
(eds.) Liberalizing
Vol. 4. Cambridge:
Demetris, M. Michely and A. Choksi
Free Trade: Brazil, Peru and Colombia.
Basil Blackwell for the World Bank.
CONJUNTURA ECONOMICA.Fundacao Getulio Vargas. Rio de Janeiro.VariousIssues.
Cc
oeRUZ, P.D, (1984) Divida Externg e Politica Econémica. Sao Paulo:Editora Brasiliense,
DIB, M. ~FSP, fees Importagées Brasileiras: Politicas de Controle eeterminantes da Demanda. Rio de Janeiro: BNDES.
Industrialization and Interventions.Brazil.
DINSMOOR,J. (1990) Brazil: Responses to the Debt Crisis. Impact on
Savings, investment, and growth. Washington, D.C.: John
Hopkins University Press for the Inter-American
Development Bank.
DOELLINGER, C., CAVALCANTI, L. and CASTELO BRANCO,F. (1977)
Politica e Estrutura das Importagées Brasileiras.
Relatorio de Pesquisa n°38, Rio de Janeiro. IPEA/INPES.
DOELLINGER, C., CAVALCANTI, L. and FARIA, H. (1974) A Politica
Brasileira de Comércio Exterior e seus Efeitos: 1967/73.
Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES. Relatorio de Pesquisa n°22.
ERBER, F. (1985) The Developmentof the Electronic Complex and
GovernmentPolicies in Brazil. World Development, 13 (3),
pp. 293-309.
(1991) Politica Industrial e de Comécio Exterior. in
Perspectivas da Economia Brasileira 1992. Rio de Janeiro.
IPEA.
in Brazil andS, P. AND TIGRE,P. (1989) Going Beyond Clones
EVAN Korea : a Comparative Analysis ofNICs Strategies in the
Computer Industry. World Development17(11).
AJNZYLBER,F. (1971) Sistema Industrial e Exportacoes de
= Manufaturados. Andlise da Experiéncia Brasileira, Rio de
Janeiro: IPEA/INPES,Relatorio de Pesquisa n°7
FISHLOW,A. (1972) Origins and Consequences of Import Substitution inBrazil. In E. Di Marco (ed.) Essays in Honor ofRaul
Prebisch. New York: Academic Press.
__ (1986) A Economia Politica do Ajustamento Brasileiro aoschoquesdopetréleo: uma nota sobre o Periodo 1974/84,PPE 19(1) April 507-550.
(1990) The Latin American State. Journal of EconomPerspectives. vol 4 ,n 3. p.61-74. e
FRISCHTAK,C.R. (1990) Specialization, Technical ChC lange andompetitiveness in the Brazilian Electronics IndIndustry and Energy Department Workingp. ustry,
Series Paper n°15. World Bank.Feb.
Textos para Discussdo
F HTAK, C.R. and DAHLMAN,C.(1990) National Systems .
nse Supporting Technical Advance in Industry: The Brazilian
Experience. Industry and Energy Department Working
Paper. Industry Series Paper n°32. World Bank.
RANCO,G.(1988) Foreign Direct Investment and
onesees of Industrialization and Trade in Developing
Countries: the Brazilian Experience. in G.K. Helleiner (ed.)
Trade Policy Industrialization and Development. Toronto e
Helsinki: Wider. UNU.
FURTADO,C (1963) The Economic Growthof Brazil. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
GONCALVES,R. (1982) Caracteristicas e Evolugao do Comércio Exteriorde Empresas Transnacionais no Brasil. Discussion Papern°9 Institute of Industrial Economics. Federal University ofRio de Janeiro. December.
GRAHAM,E.M.(1991) Strategic Trade Policy and The Multinational
Enterprise in Developing Countries. in P. Buckley and J.Clegg (eds.) Multinational Enterprise in Less DevelopedCountries. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
GUIMARAES,E.A., MALAN,P.S, and ARAUWJO Jr. (1982). ChangingInternational Investment Strategies: The 'new forms’ ofForeign Investment in Brazil. Discussion Paper n°45,IPEA/INPES, Rio de Janeiro.
GUIMARAES,E.P. (1989) Recent Trade Policy in Brazil. Kiel WorkingPaper n°389. The Kiel Institute of World Economics
HELPMAN,E. and KRUGMAN,P. (1989) Trade Policy and MarketStructure. Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press.
HEWITT, T. (1992) Employment and Skills in theIndustry. in H. Schmitz and J. CassiIndustrial Development. LeExperience in Electronics aRoutledge
verlty and Prosperity. in E. BachaandH.Klein. » 1945-85: the incompletetransition. New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press.
Industrialization and Interventions. Brazil.
HONG,W.(1979) Trade Distortions and Employment Growthin Korea.
Seoul, Korea DevelopmentInstitute.
HORSTMANN,J. and MARKUNSEN,R.(1986) Up the Average Cost Curve:
Inefficient Entry and The New Protecionism. Journal of
International Economics 20, pp. 225-247.
HORTA, M. H., PIANI, G. and KUME,H. (1991) A Politica Cambial e
Comercial. in Perspectivas da Economia Brasileira 1992.
Rio de Janeiro. IPEA.
IBGE (1990) Estatisticas Histéricas do Brasil. Séries Econémicas,
Demogrdficas e Sociais de 1550 a 1988. Rio de Janeiro.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND —IMF— (a) Various years. Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions.
Washington DC.
(b) Various years. International Financial
Statistics. Washington DC.
11 LANEJAMENTO ECONONICO E SOCIAL—IPEA— (1979)
INSTITUTO OSeaiwagees do GovernoGelsel. 1974-78. Brasilia: March,
t, Some. H, (1965) Tariffs and Economic Development
JOHNSON “ineoretical Issues. Journal of DevelopmentStudies, 1(1)
pp. 25
1) Korea In P. Demetris, M. Michely and A. Choksi.
KIM, S. K- Teecalleing Free Trade: Korea, Philippines and Singapore.Vol 4, Washington, D. C. : World Bank. Publications,
OCIATION—KFTA— (1989) MajorOREA FOREIGN TRADEASS! N
K m Statistics of Korean Economy. Seoul.
loping Countries. 1984) Trade Policies in Developing n RW.KRUEGER,a_ Be P.B. Kenen(eds.)_ Handbook of Internationa}
Economics. Vol. 1. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science
Publishers.
4) The U.S. Responseto ForeignIndustrial ThKRUGMAN, Scnas Papers on Economic Activity vo], 1 “"9@ting.
Textos para DiscussGo
KUME, H.(1988) A Protecdo Efetiva Proposta na Reforma Tarifaria. Rio
, de Janeiro: Fundacao Estudos de Comércio Exterior
(FUNCEX), mimeo.
LAGO,L. A. C. (1990) A Retomada do Crescimento e as Distorgdes do
Udon 1967-73 in M. P. ABREU(ed.) A Ordem do
Progresso: cem anos de politica econémica republicana.
1889-1989. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus.
LALL, S. (1991a) Explaining Industrial Success in the Developing World.
in S. Lall and V.N. Balasubramaranyan.(eds.) Current
Issues in Development Economics. London: Macmillan.
(1991b) Bank Approach to Industrialization: An OED Studyof Three Industrializing Countries. Washington, WorldBank.
(1992) Technological Capabilities and Industrialization.World Development, vol. 20 (2) p.165-186.
LALL, S. and KELL,G. (1991) Industrial Development in DevelopingCountries and The Role of Government Interventions.BancaNazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review. n°178,September.
LEFF, N.H.(1968) The Brazilian Capital Goods Industry. 1929-1964.Cambridge. M.A. : Harvard University Press.
LESSA, Cc. (1982) Quinze Anos de Politica Econémica. Sao Paulo, Ed.Brasiliense. Published in English as, Fifieen Years ofEconomic Policy in Brazil. Economic Bulletin for LatinAmerica, November 1964.
LUCKE,M. (1990) Traditional Labour-Intensive Industries in NewlyIndustrializing Countries. The Case of Brazil. KielerStudien, University ofKiel, Tubingen.
Industlalization and Interventions. Brazil.
MALAN,P., BONELLI, R., ABREU, M. and PEREIRA. VEO.ae),Pelee
Econémica Externa e Industrializagao no Brasil.Rio de Janetro: IPEA/INPES.
: ades a,MALAN,P and BONELLI, R. (1990) Brazil 1950-80: aeNES
Growth Oriented Policies. Rio de Janeiro:
Internal Discussion Paper n°187.
j ial, Rio deMATESCO,V. (1988) As Novas Diretrizes da Politica Industria
4 oliticaJaneiro. Relatorio do IPEA/INPES Seminario de Poli
Industrial. julho.
@ é -1989. in M.P.A Opera dos Tr s Cruzados 1985-1 M
MOREE enGeeg AOpeten do Progresso: cem anos de politica
econémica republicana. 1889-1989. Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Campus.
MOREIRA, H.C. and ARAUJO,A.B.(1984) A Politica Brasileira de
Importagées: uma descri¢ado. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES,
série EPICO n°l.
id ForeignA . W.(1971) Import Substitution an
Monee Se Feetadee Oxford Economic Papers vol. 23 pp.
120-135.
Exportagées de
. (1983) O Regime de Drawback nas
MUSALEM,  Mareifiaturdon e a Balancga Comercial no Brasil.. Rio deJaneiro: Pesquisa e Planejamento Econémico 13(3):745_762.
‘ARM. R. and MILLER, W.(1975) Multinationals in Brazil and
NEWF, oFepee Structural Sources of Economic and non Economic
Power. Washington, U.S. Senate, 1975.
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELO:(OECD) (1989) Main Economic Indicators, PMENT
Statistics 1969-1988 .
Historical
PASTORE,A. C., SAVASINI,J.A, ROSA,J. and KUME, H.(1979}Efetiva as Exportacées no Brasil. Rilo d
PEREIRA, J.E. de C. (1974) Financiamento ExternEcon6émico no Brasil: 1966:73. RiodColecao Relatérios de Pesquisa n°27.
Prole Janetro: Funore?
0 & Cresci ntole Janeiro; IPEA/INPES
Textos para Discussdo
ustria de Informatica: Desenvolvimento
EISSGIBE; oeae Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus.
RES stabilizagao e Reforma: 1964-67 inM. P.ieAendo Progresso: cem anos de Politica ;
cepaRIEe republicana. 1889-1989. Rio de Janeiro: EditoraCampus.
ABREU
ROSS,S. A., WESTERFIELD, R.W. AND JAFFE,J. (1988) CorporateFinance. Boston:Irwin.
SERRA,J. (1982) Ciclos e Mudancas Estruturais na Economia Brasiledo Pés-Guerra. in L.G. M. Beluzzo e Coutinho, R. (eds.)Desenvolvimento Capitalista no Brasil: ensaios sobre acrise. Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense.
ira
velopment.Lessons from the Brazilian Experie;nce in Electronics andAutomation. New York: Routledge
SIMONSEN, MH.(1988) Brazil.
eds.) The Open Economy. Tools Jor Policymakers inDeveloping Countries. Washington D.C.: Oxford University
Press for the World Bank.
in R. Dornbusch and Helmers, F. L.C.H.
Brazil, 1952-68. Thesis submitted to the Univer:
Londonfor the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, J
SOCHACZEWSKI, A.C. (1980) Financial and Economic Development of
Sily of
uly.
STIGLER.Gu, (1951) The Division iS Tinethe Market, of Labouris Limitedb e» Journal of Political F, Yy the Extent ofConomy, 59,
i de C. and ALMEIDA, R
Mnanciamento de Pr, Z
aneiro: Relatori pietas Mdustrialo de Pesqu
-A.G.(1979)
is no Brasil. Rio deisa n°g, IPEA/INPES.
Industlalization and Interventions. Brazll.
1,
SUZIGAN, W. (1978) Politica Industrial no Brasil. in W. Sena{ee bis deIndustria: Politicas, Instituigées = Peeeno -Janeiro: IPEA/INPES Série Monografica n°28.
——____ (1980) Barreiras nao Tarifarias as Importacoes. Rio deJaneiro: IPEA/INPES. Discussion Paper n :
ee (1984) Investment in the Manufacturing Industryiy oiBrazil, 1869-1939, Thesis submitted to the ;
Londonfor the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
‘ Desempenho e1986) A Indistria Brasileira em 1985/86. c
pone in R. CARNEIRO(ed.) Politica Econémica da Nova
Republica. Sao Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra
——_——_—_. a titividade nos
1988 Reestruturag o Industrial e Compe: t
ee Avancados e nos NICs Asidticos: Ligoes para oO
Brasil. Sao Paulo: Governo do Estado de Sao Paulo.
TARES, a O Capitalismoituig o de Importagées ao
TAY. , Saneyeeae Economia Brasileira. Rio de
Janeiro: Zahar Editores.
ARES. . (1985) O Desenvolvimento e a PoliticaTAV. , ausimae Deane de 70- Impasses e Alternativas, Rio
de Janeiro: Institute of Industrial Economics. Mimeo,
TENDLER, J. (1968) Electric Powerin Brazil. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard° University Press.
TOPIK, S. (1980) State Interventionism in a Liberal Regime: B




TYLER, W.G. (1976) Manufactured Export Expansion and
Industrialization in Brazil. Kieler Studien n°134, University
ofKiel.
(1981) The Brazilian Industria
MA:Lexington Books.
 t Economy, Lexington
UNCTAD (1990) Handbook of International Trade anStatistics. Geneva, d Development
Textos para Discussdo
UNESCO(1989) Statistical Yearbook 1988 , Paris.
UNITED NATION (UN-ITSY) International Trade Statistical Year-book.
Various years. Geneva.
(UN-HIT) Handbook of International Trade.Various years.oo Geneva.
-R. (1979) Industrial Investment in a
VERSIANI, F Brezta experience before 1914. U




© como Instrumento dePolitica Econdémica. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES ColecaoRelatorios de Pesquisa n°47,
VILLELA, A. V. and SUZIGAN,
Economic Growth
monografica n°10
W. (1977) Government Policies and- Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES.Série
. Vu and BAER, W. (1980) O Setor Privad.e Politicas para
o
5IPEA/INPES Col
América Latina: Uma biopciones, Santiago: PREAI
Squeda de
Organization. LC. International Labour
. ) As Atividades Empre 5
=
presariais do Governo
ive a no Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Economia 23(3), pp
WESTPHAL, L (1982) Fos,
- Syrquim and S‘ability, Technolog » and ity i ir
+ Academic Press. 4 Faulty in vet
Concentra,Cao na Indistriq€nto Econ©mico 17(1) 161 a
nan Resources Special Re, rt. Worl
nitry study, Washington, D
‘Bank VO"
- C. : World Bank.
Industialization and Interventions. Brazil.
(1983) Brazil, Industrial Policies and Manufactured
Exports. A World Bank country study. Washington,D.C. :
World Bank.
 
(1984) Brazil. Financial Systems Review. A World
Bankcountry study. Washington, D. C. : World Bank.
——--______ (1991) World Development Report. Washington,D.C.
: World Bank.
ZONINSEIN,J. (1984) Atitudes Nacionais e Financiamento da Industria:
A Experiéncia Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Discussion Paper
n°63 Institute of Industrial Economics. Federal University
of Rio de Janeiro. December.
ZYSMAN,J. (1983) Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial
Systems andthe Politics of Industrial Change. Ithaca,
Cornell University Press.
